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Abstract 
Through almost three years of civil war and numerous accounts of mass atrocity crimes, 
committed by the regime, the United Nations Security Council has yet to reach a clear 
agreement on resolutions that can effectively put an end to the Syrian conflict. However, 
the conflict has been viciously debated within the Security Council and several draft 
resolutions has been proposed and vetoed, while accusations of hidden agendas of regime 
change and economic self-interests has been hurled back and forth. It is within this 
evident conflict that our research paper takes its point of departure. The suggested reasons 
for the division within the Security Council are many, but several are concerned with the 
UNSC resolution, which by reference to The Responsibility to Protect equipped NATO 
with a mandate to intervene in Libya. Although the intervention effectively halted the 
Libyan state from committing mass atrocities, it has since been loudly critiqued for going 
to far in paving the way for regime change. By arguing that the R2P norm holds a role in 
the apparent conflict within the United Nations Security Council and that the issue of 
regime change poses a significant challenge for the Security Council in committing to 
unified action towards the Syrian crisis, we commence our research through study of the 
perceptions articulated in relation to the Syrian crisis, within the United Nations Security 
Council. By developing the perceptions held by the respective permanent member states 
of the Security Council, we find that both the Responsibility to Protect and the issue of 
regime change are significant factors in causing the division within the Council. 
Specifically, the different perceptions of the Syrian crisis are very much related to 
differences in the perceptions of the issue of regime change and the responsibility to 
protect, thus making them central to the conflict between the states.   
We undertake our research through the Grounded Theory Method. Thus we 
underpin our arguments in a grounded empirical manner. The paper contains an analysis 
of the presented R2P norm within the UN, followed by a thorough analysis of the five 
permanent member states of the United Nations Security Council’s perceptions of the 
Syrian crisis. Thus meaning derived from these perceptions will be analysed in relation to 
the R2P norm and the issue of regime change. We argue that these aspects are interlinked, 
hence our argument above.      
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The intention of this chapter is to introduce the logic and purpose of this research 
paper. By unfolding important aspects of the debate relating to our field of 
research, we wish to set the stage for our further proceedings. 
 
1.1 Field of research  
Mass atrocities and non-intervention   
During the 1990s the world witnessed a number of mass atrocity crimes 
committed by states, targeting their own civilian populations (Thakur 2006:246; 
UN 2004:13). Instead of causing reaction, these incidents exposed the 
international community as divided in opinions and frozen in actions (UN 
2004:34). In situations of extreme violence, where the world community expected 
the United Nations (UN) to commit to humanitarian intervention, it was pacified 
by discrepancies in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), leaning towards 
the principle of sovereignty inherent in the UN Charter.  
The former Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, addressed this 
problem of non-intervention in the name of sovereignty, when he asked the world 
community to not let this principle stand in the way of hindering mass atrocity 
crimes:  
 
“(…) no legal principle — not even sovereignty — can ever shield crimes against 
humanity. Where such crimes occur and peaceful attempts to halt them have been 
exhausted, the Security Council has a moral duty to act on behalf of the 
international community.”  
(UN 2000:35) 
 
This statement points to the challenge of reconciling the principle of state 
sovereignty with humanitarian intervention. A challenge the UN was facing at the 
beginning of the new millennium.  
Page 6 of 100 
 
 
 
 
Responsibility to Protect  
To address the clash between state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention, a 
new idea known as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was developed. Beginning 
with its elaboration by the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS), which focused on the need for a change in the perception of 
sovereignty, this idea has developed over time. The 2005 report of the Secretary 
General In Larger Freedom describes the R2P as the international community’s 
responsibility to: 
 
“(…) use diplomatic, humanitarian and other methods to help protect civilian 
populations, and that if such methods appear insufficient the Security Council 
may out of necessity decide to take action under the Charter, including 
enforcement action, if so required.”  
(UN 2005:59) 
 
Eventually R2P was ratified in a doctrine, unanimously adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 2005, while the UNSC formalised its 
support for this doctrine in 2006 (UNGA 2005, para.138-140; UNSC 2006, para. 
4). Although the doctrine was not a mirror to the original idea of the ICISS, it did 
reflect its core perceptions (Evans 2011:36). 
 
R2P in use 
Since its ratification in 2005 by the UNGA, the R2P doctrine has been referred to 
in a number of resolutions, passed by the UNSC, aimed at stopping mass atrocity 
crimes in sovereign states (ICRtoP 2013). Not all cases of reaction, where R2P 
was given as a reason for intervention, have been successful. However, the case of 
Libya in 2011, although sparking a division of opinion, can be taken as a clear 
example of action by UNSC to stop mass atrocity crimes, committed by a state 
against its own people (UNSC RES 2011). Enforced by NATO-troops, the UNSC 
resolution effectively halted the Libyan regime in committing mass atrocity 
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crimes against its own citizens, while referring to a state’s responsibility towards 
its own people – a responsibility inherent in the R2P.  
 
The conflict within 
Even though the UNSC resolution 1973 on Libya is left as an example of a 
powerful and united UNSC, the fact that five countries including Russia and 
China decided not to vote for the resolution, is an important part of the story 
(UNSC 2011a). In addition to this, it has been pointed out that the intervention in 
Libya in the end exceeded its mandate, by causing a regime change, thus creating 
scepticism towards R2P and constituting a setback for the idea (Evans 2011:41; 
Information 2012). That the conflict within the UNSC is persistent seems 
strikingly clear with the emergence of the Syrian conflict. Through the almost 
three-year long civil war, members of the UNSC have vetoed three draft-
resolutions, and the Syrian government continues to kill its own peoples (UNSC 
2011b:2; UNSC 2012b:2; UNSC 2012d:2).  
 
The debate on R2P 
Aidan Hehir has a clear explanation to the divergence between the Libyan and 
Syrian case. In focusing on the historical track-record of UNSC initiated 
humanitarian intervention, he concludes that one cannot expect a specific set of 
factors to be superseding influential in all instances of intervention. 
 
“As surprising as Resolution 1973 arguably was, however, it is consistent with the 
Security Council’s record of inconsistency” 
      
  (Hehir 2013:157) 
 
Rather, he argues that the reasons for intervening in humanitarian conflicts are 
many and changing. He specifically states that the R2P’s role in changing the 
international community’s perception of intervention has been overestimated. 
Rather the intervention in Libya was a case of contingency:  
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“R2P has possibly become one factor in the decisionmaking calculus of states, but 
it is one among a great many – a loud voice in a large, disparate, chanting 
crowd.”  
 (Hehir 2013:159) 
 
The conclusion reached by Hehir is controversial for the reason that it dismisses 
the idea that a norm like R2P would ever have consistent influence, if not backed 
by a change of the fundamental power structures of the international community 
(Hehir 2013:159). 
In relation to Hehir’s inclination towards a complex of factors, as decisive 
to choosing intervention as opposed to non-intervention, Roy Allison emphasises 
the importance of relations and interests. In the case of Syria he claims that 
Russia’s current stance of non-intervention, leaves it in a powerful position within 
the Middle East and the international community (Allison 2013:821).  
In opposition to this, Ralph Janik concludes that the Russians and the 
Chinese are not directly opposed to military intervention and regime change in 
Syria although they are proponents of the status quo (Janik 2013:82). Janik would 
be inclined to agree with Hehir’s conclusion; that many factors are decisive to the 
choice of intervention or non-intervention. In the case of Syria Janik argues that 
the Russian and Chinese resistance, towards UNSC intervention, is a result of the 
limited role that the two states were allowed to play in the aftermath of the Libyan 
intervention:  
 
“Thus, it seems that ignoring their interests when it came to dividing the 
Libyan pie has showed the impossibility not only of creating an atmosphere of 
mutual trust in the Security Council but also of establishing an effective and 
coherent approach towards the implementation of the Responsibility to 
Protect.”  
         (Janik 2013:83) 
 
Prominent advocate of R2P, Gareth Evans, has turned his attention to a dilemma 
concerning R2P-intervention, appearing in the aftermath of the reactions towards 
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Gaddafi in Libya and Gbagbo in Côte d’Ivoire (Evans 2011:40f). Evans states that 
the reluctance towards R2P, which was first displayed by the international 
community, has worn off to some degree. By this he suggests that there is less 
resistance towards R2P, on the grounds that it is not perceived as a direct threat to 
the common interpretation of sovereignty (Evans 2011:39f). But both Evans and 
Alex J. Bellamy talks of a new point of controversy appearing on the international 
agenda following the interventions in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire, here exemplified 
by Bellamy:  
 
”(...) the problem was not so much the use of force to protect civilians from mass 
atrocities – in both cases this had been duly authorised by the Security Council – 
but the facts that this use of force resulted in regime change and that this result 
was intended by those responsible for implementing the Security Council’s 
decisions even though the Council itself had not specifically authorised regime 
change.”  
      (Bellamy 2011:22) 
 
In this way Bellamy supports the notion that the recent interventions have resulted 
in new disagreements relating to R2P, namely the extent of R2P-related 
interventions. Bellamy suggests that the opposition towards invoking regime 
change might have caused the R2P norm to loose traction as the new standard of 
intervention in relation to intra-state conflicts and mass atrocity crimes.  
Parts of the academic debate concerned with the future of the R2P norm, 
which we have just outlined, thus suggests that Libya was a highpoint for R2P and 
that the impact of the norm in international relations might be on the retreat. Thus 
we direct our attention to the future of the R2P norm, which seems to be decided 
as the conflict in Syria unfolds. To this effect Evans raises an interesting question 
relating to the development of R2P after the intervention in Libya: 
 
”But there has certainly been a negative reaction to the very broad way in which 
NATO interpreted its mandate in Libya, and the question we have to address is 
whether we now have a new benchmark for how to handle extreme cases in the 
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future, or whether this year will rather prove to be the high water mark from 
which the tide will subsequently recede.”  
(Evans 2011:40) 
 
The question that Evans raises leads us in the direction of assessing what part R2P 
is playing in the debates concerning the Syrian situation. Is R2P still being 
understood as a legitimate reason to react to situations of mass atrocity-crimes or 
has the norm outplayed its role in international relations? Thus we are looking to 
investigate how the R2P norm can be seen as represented in the UNSC meetings 
concerning the Syrian crisis.  
Throughout this chapter, we have established that R2P possesses a central 
role within the international community, but that it is difficult to estimate whether 
the norm has become important in defining the actions of the UNSC and the rest 
of the international community. Not of less importance is the question of whether 
the fear of regime change has trumped the R2P norm, and thereby constitutes the 
deciding factor in the present UNSC deadlock.  
 
Consequently, throughout this research paper, we argue, that the R2P norm holds 
a role in the apparent conflict within the United Nations Security Council in 
regard to the Syrian crisis. Furthermore we claim that the issue of regime change 
poses a significant challenge for the Security Council to take unified collective 
actions towards the Syrian crisis.  
 
1.2 Approach of this research paper 
In this section we outline the overall research agenda and approach of this 
research paper. The debate, which we have unfolded above, frames the purpose of 
this research paper: to examine to what extend the perceptions of the UNSC 
member states, regarding the Syrian conflict, encompass the R2P norm. 
Furthermore this study is aimed at understanding the role played by regime 
change in relation to the choice of intervention or non-intervention in Syria. The 
issue of regime change is included, as the debate above suggests that this aspect is 
a possible challenge to the consolidation of the R2P norm, as a decisive factor in 
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choosing intervention or non-intervention in Syria. In order to underpin our 
argument, the research is conducted from the following problem statement:  
 
To what extent is the ‘responsibility to protect’ present in the perceptions of the 
five permanent member states of United Nations Security Council regarding the 
Syrian conflict and what is the role of regime change in this context? 
 
As the problem statement is comprised of different elements, we find it necessary 
to elaborate on these. Here, the different elements will be touched upon, but 
several of the points will be further elaborated throughout the following chapters.   
As evident from the problem statement, the main focus of this paper will be on the 
perceptions of R2P relating to Syria. We aim to clarify, how the member states of 
the UNSC perceive, the Syrian conflict. Their perceptions will be derived from 
statements made to the UNSC. We stress that we do not wish to judge the UNSC 
member states as either “good” or “bad” R2P states. We accept that generally 
speaking, the R2P norm is not a clearly defined entity, but rather a norm, which is 
shaped by different actors, through their perceptions and actions, and in turn shape 
the actions and perceptions of the individual actor.  
To be able to answer ‘to what extend’ we need to first clarify how the R2P 
norm is perceived. As the R2P has largely been developed through the UN, we 
study how the norm is perceived within the UN. The following two research 
questions frame our approach:  
 
1) How is the norm of ‘responsibility to protect’ framed by the United Nations?  
 
2) How do the permanent member states of the United Nations Security Council 
perceive the Syrian conflict?  
 
The questions will be answered in an empirical manner. To do this we apply the 
Grounded Theory Method (GTM). The GTM will be applied to answer the 
research questions, which provides us with findings, enabling us to answer the 
problem statement. GTM provides us with analytical tools to examine the R2P 
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norm and the perceptions held by the member states. Furthermore, process is the 
object of analysis in a GTM approach; there is a focus on the process from the 
occurrence of a problem to the derived idea and action hereof. This process is 
relevant in our analysis; the Syrian conflict is the problem, we then analyse how 
the member states perceive the conflict, and to what extend their actions, derived 
from their perceptions, correlate with the idea of R2P. This will be further 
elaborated in the following chapter.  
As apparent, from the problem statement, we only wish to investigate the 
five permanent member states of the UNSC. We acknowledge the influence of the 
ten non-permanent member states on decisions in the Security Council. However, 
due to the veto right vested in the five permanent member states, we assign 
greater importance to these. As we study member states, we do not intend to 
analyse decisions made by the UNSC as a unity. Furthermore we do not intend to 
study the UN as an institution. Therefore, the relationship between the different 
organs, e.g. the General Assembly and the Security Council, in relation to R2P, 
will not be our focus of attention.   
Finally, as the problem statement clarifies, we are only studying the 
perceptions of the Syrian conflict, as opposed to the occurrence and development 
of the conflict. Thus the conflict is central for our paper, but will not be the focus 
of attention. The conflict will only be included when the member states refer to it 
in their statements.    
 
Chapter 2 Methodology  
 
Throughout this next chapter
1
 we will illustrate how the Grounded Theory 
Method (GTM) will frame our research and support answering our problem 
statement. As emphasised in the introduction, we aim at producing empirical 
evidence, to support our statement and answer the questions posed. We find it 
necessary to ground our research, thus the GTM is selected as approach. This will 
                                                 
1
 This chapter is drafted in cooperation with former group member Bérénice Perroud.  
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give us a clear idea of how the R2P norm is perceives within the United Nations 
and how the permanent member states of the Security Council perceives the 
situation in Syria, which is a case of mass atrocity.   
 
The Grounded Theory Method has its point of departure in the work of Anselm 
Strauss and Juliet Corbin. Research conducted within the GTM approach is 
anchored in data and generates empirical evidence to clarify the field of research. 
The GTM is not initially intended for research within the field of political science. 
Rather this method is most commonly applied to objects within the sociological 
and phenomenological field of research, where humans and their actions are at the 
centre of attention. Here the purpose of the research is to develop a grounded 
theory on how the elements of the field are related (Strauss & Corbin 1998:12ff & 
Boolsen 2010:207ff). One of the strengths within GTM is that it enables the 
researcher to discover underlying dimensions of the object of analysis (Strauss & 
Corbin 1998:12ff). Applying GTM in our research enables us to discover how the 
UNSC acts towards Syria as compared to the R2P norm within the UN by giving 
us specific analytical tools. This will be explained below.  
Since the international community of states constitutes our field of interest, 
our field of research is more complex than what the method was intended for. 
This is due to fact that a study of the international community has more levels 
than a study of the individual, within the phenomenological approach. This has 
the implication that we must exercise some creativity in order to conceptualise 
this method, making it applicable to our object of interest. Throughout this paper 
we understand the UN as an object of human influence. Thus the structure of the 
UN is created and controlled by humans. We therefore perceive it as an 
expression of the process of human ideas, action and interaction. This is further 
elaborated in the forthcoming section.  
 
2.1 Philosophy of Science  
The philosophy of science of the GTM is another reason why we have chosen this 
approach. The philosophy of science is fundamental to understanding the logic of 
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our research, as it what shapes our approach to the field of research. In this section 
we account for how the philosophy of science has influenced our research. 
 
Interactionism and Pragmatism as epistemological frame 
The Grounded Theory Method has an interactionist and pragmatist 
epistemological outlook. The epistemological outlook takes priority over the 
ontology, as it constructs the frames of what is. 
 
Interactionism and the Action/Interaction-perspective 
Interactionism or symbolic interactionism implies that meaning is given to and 
derived from human action and interaction (Corbin & Strauss 2008:2). In short 
Herbert Blumer explains interactionism through three premises (Blumer 1969:2). 
First, humans act towards phenomena, physical as well metaphysical, on the basis 
of what meaning they assign to these. Second, the meaning that one assigns to 
these phenomena is derived from interaction with other individuals. Third, the 
meanings are handled in and modified through interpretation of the phenomena 
that one encounters (Blumer 1969:2). 
This perspective encourages us to address the issue of human action and 
interaction related to our field of interest, namely the Security Council’s 
perception of the Syrian conflict in regard to R2P. Specifically, we wish to 
uncover the permanent member states’ perception of how to handle intra-state 
crises through their action and interaction regarding the Syrian conflict. The 
significance of phenomena within this paper will become more apparent in 
chapter 4.   
 
Pragmatism and process  
The pragmatist perspective also emphasises action as the main point of interest, 
thus we will place prominence in action throughout our research. Action is, in a 
pragmatist view, believed to be developed within a process as an answer to 
problematic situations (Corbin & Strauss 2008:2f.). Action and interaction are in 
turn perceived as reactions to unusual problems, which needs solving. A logical 
consequence of the pragmatist focus on action and interaction is that it is 
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concerned with process - the process of action and interaction towards 
problematic situations (Corbin & Strauss 2008:3). In this regard we interpret the 
R2P as an idea derived from a process. By process we are referring to problems 
derived in relation to an occurring phenomenon. Such a problem in turn spurs the 
emergence of an idea, which causes action or interaction. In that context R2P is 
viewed as an idea, arising from the problem of non-intervention in intra-state 
conflicts. In that regard R2P was constructed to facilitate action in response to 
mass atrocities committed within sovereign states. The paper then sets out to 
study how the permanent member states of the UNSC perceives phenomena 
related to how to act upon the mass atrocities committed during the Syrian crisis.    
  
Interactionism and Meanings within Actions 
The interactionist perspective furthermore lets us study how actors perceive the 
phenomena, which we derive in chapter 4. By scrutinising the actions and 
interactions of the states within the UNSC, we will be able to extract the meaning 
that they assign to the Syrian conflict in relation to R2P. When analysing the R2P 
norm there is, however, a slight adjustment from the original interactionist 
approach as we do not examine direct action, but rather declarations of intent 
framed around action or non-action.  
 
Pragmatist focus on effects  
Apart from this, the pragmatic approach lets us obtain the standpoint that objects 
are perceived from their inherent effects. Strauss and Corbin takes over James 
Dewey’s view that the test of ideas lie within the consequences of the acts to 
which ideas leads. This relates to the assumption that the envisaged consequence 
of a particular action affects whatever action is actually taken, that is, particular 
actions are chosen because of their expected outcome (Corbin & Strauss, 2008: 3). 
By transferring this perspective to the R2P we may understand that the actors will 
perceive R2P through its inherent effects. Whether this is its effect on mass 
atrocities or state sovereignty, it makes sense for us to look into the actor’s 
perception of R2P, in order to understand the way in which they act or abstain 
from action in regard to the Syrian conflict.  
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In sum the field of interest of this research paper, is concerned with the process of 
human action and interaction in relation to ideas derived from problems posed by 
occurring phenomena. Therefore this epistemological understanding provides us 
with a relevant basis for answering our research question. 
 
Ontology of Grounded Theory Method 
The ontology of GTM is not as extensive as the epistemology and does not carry 
the same importance, which is a logical consequence of the pragmatic and 
interactionist philosophy of science. Thus this paragraph will not be as extensive 
as the previous. 
 
The ontological outlook of GTM perceives the universe as a changeable entity, 
which is consistent with contingency of knowledge. The phenomenon of the 
universe is however partly determinable through a naturalistic analytical approach 
(Corbin & Strauss 2008:5f). The phenomenon of interest to research conducted 
within the GTM approach is humans and how they, through action, interaction 
and responses, construct and shape the structures, which, in turn, shape their lives 
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008:5f). In the process of shaping norms humans construct 
and change their world through action and interaction (Corbin & Strauss 2008: 6). 
Our research is very much concerned with the processes of human action that 
shape norms. But instead of looking at individual humans, as the GTM was 
originally constructed for, we apply it to a field of research, where the actors are 
member states of the UN. In relation to our research, we are concerned with 
examining how the permanent member states of the UNSC act and interact to 
shape the norm of state sovereignty in relation to intra-state humanitarian crises.    
 
2.2 Operationalisation of Grounded Theory Method 
The section will clarify which analytical tools and specific coding strategies from 
the GTM that will be used to answer the problem statement. We will therefore 
only elaboration on the parts of the GTM approach, which we do intend to utilise 
during our research.  
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Grounded Theory Method is in itself very flexible, as the method allows the 
researcher a great deal of freedom. The GTM is not to be perceived as strict rules 
but rather a craft that should be mastered, and in that way is not a dogmatic 
discipline (Strauss & Corbin 1998:14). This enables us to choose from different 
parts of the GTM that will let us answer the problem statement outlined in section 
1.2 Approach of this Research Paper. The GTM is flexible to the extent that it 
should fulfil the main criteria for evaluation (Strauss & Corbin 1998:268). These 
criteria can be divided into two categories. The first category of criteria is 
concerned with the validity, reliability and credibility of the data (Strauss & 
Corbin 1998:268). While the second category is directly linked to the GTM and 
concern the process in which the research has been conducted and whether it is 
empirically grounded (Strauss & Corbin 1998:268). These criteria will serve to 
validate our research and ensure that our collection of empirical data takes place 
within the relevant frames, in accordance with its declared purpose. These will be 
clarified in chapter 3.  
 
Applying Grounded Theory Method   
There are five stages within the methodological framework of this research paper, 
which will be elaborated bellow in figure 1. First the aim of the research is 
established; secondly the empirical data is collected on the basis of the problem 
statement; thirdly the categories are formed on the basis of the research question; 
fourthly the categories are developed and analysed through axial coding; and then 
fifthly the problem statement in answered through a comparison of the results 
from the fourth stage. The different stages are illustrated in figure 1 bellow.   
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Stage One 
Stage one is carried out in chapter 1, where the debate is described and the 
problem statement is presented. The problem statement will be what narrows 
down our search for data and makes the research questions central (Strauss & 
Corbin 1998:36ff).    
 
Stage Two 
Second stage is to collect the data that will serve as the foundation of the analysis. 
Within the GTM approach, many different sources can be perceived as data, and 
the empirical data of a research paper will therefore typically be characterized by 
variation (Strauss & Corbin 2008:27). This paper is also characterized by 
variation, but this will be elaborated in chapter 3.  
 
Stage Three 
Hence the interactionist view of philosophy of science it is essential to studying 
action and interaction regarding a specific phenomenon. Thus the most important 
Figure 1 
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analytical tool within GTM is coding, which enables the extraction of meaning 
from the data. Coding is applied at all stages of a GTM-led process along with 
different analytical tools. In this paper we will code on the basis of categories, 
which are found through the analytical tool: in-vivo coding. In-vivo coding 
consists of using the language of the object of analysis to form categories (Strauss 
& Corbin 2008:65,82). This tool is especially useful when coding on very 
compact informative texts, which this research paper does, because the codes are 
explicit in the arguments of the texts. Within the GTM the language of the actors 
is very important, as it illustrates how actors perceive phenomena. Thus it presents 
us with the opportunity to understand how the members of the UN perceive the 
R2P norm and the Syrian conflict, and thereby enables us to answer our problem 
statement. The in-vivo coding and the purpose of categories are further elaborated 
in chapter 4, where the in-vivo coding is executed. The categories found in stage 
three will act as the point of departure for answering our research questions.  
 
Stage Four 
Stage four, axial coding, is where the categories are fully developed. This consists 
of coding around the axis of a category where it represents the core of the object 
of analysis, and thereby adding depth and structure to the category (Strauss & 
Corbin 1998:123ff; 2008:195). The categories that are used are the ones found 
using in-vivo coding from stage three, where the foundation of the axial coding is 
derived. The axial coding, within this paper, will be executed through two 
analyses according to the research questions. During the axial coding 
subcategories derive. These relate to our overall categories found through the in-
vivo coding. Through the subcategories we will be able to expand and define the 
content of our categories. Throughout the coding it is important to be observant of 
new emerging subcategories.  
The axial coding analysis consists of three steps; step one is to write memos 
while going through the data; step two consists of three tasks that should be 
executed; and step three entails linking the subcategories to the category (Corbin 
& Strauss 1998: 126,135f). The final step is what answers the research questions. 
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The three steps are illustrated below in figure 2 and accounted for in the next 
paragraphs.  
 
 
 
 
Step One 
Step one consists of writing memos, thus memos will be written throughout the 
handling of data. Memos are written records of analysis and their scope is to give 
the researcher a tool to keep track of thoughts and findings during the research, 
which enables the researcher to be grounded (Corbin & Strauss 2008:117). Thus 
the content of memos will often spur from reflections. However, because it is not 
the form of memos that is important, but the fact that reflections have been written 
down concurrently, there is no correct approach to constructing them (Corbin & 
Strauss 2008:118). In this way the memos are both a way of moving the analysis 
forward and to trace the final conclusion backwards (Corbin & Strauss 
2008:118f). We will use the memos to organise relevant points relating to the 
categories from the data. Thus we will be able to derive subcategories, and 
examining the data with the purpose of developing the specific subcategories and 
thereby the categories.   
 
Step Two 
As described step two consist of different tasks. The first task consists of laying 
out the properties and dimensions that are directly linked to the categories. The 
properties are the characteristics that define and explore the meaning of the 
Figure 2 
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categories, while the dimensions are the range of the properties (Corbin & Strauss 
1998:101,116f). Properties and dimensions will become evident through the 
reflections in the memos, which enables us to proceed to the second task. The 
second task is concerned with the conditions, action/interaction and consequences, 
which relate to the interactionistic perspective of the philosophy of science 
accounted for above. Through interactionism categories and subcategories derive. 
This then relate to the third and final task, which moves the coding to step three; it 
consists of relating the different subcategories found during the coding to the 
overall categories.  
 
Step Three 
This step is what develops the categories fully by linking the subcategories to the 
categories. Through this procedure we answer our research questions concerning 
the perception of the R2P norm and the statements held by the permanent member 
states of the UNSC regarding the Syrian conflict.  
 
Stage 5 
As a result of the four prior stages, stage five is within the GTM approach 
concerned with creating a theory. However, as that is not the aim of this research 
paper, stage five is framed differently. The aim is to answer to what extent the 
R2P norm is present in the debate within the UNSC and what the role of regime 
change is in this context. Thus the analysis is based on a thorough examination of 
the perceptions held by the member states for the purpose of comparing these with 
the R2P norm. Stage five of our research is then not in itself a step within the 
GTM framework, but will be undertaken on our own account, though it is founded 
on the GTM approach.  
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Chapter 3 Data  
 
This chapter is divided in two sections. The first section focus on data for research 
question 1) How is the norm of ‘responsibility to protect’ framed by the United 
Nations? and the second focus on date for research question 2) How do the 
permanent member states of the United Nations Security Council perceive the 
Syrian conflict? As the different data is presented it will be followed by a 
clarification of why we have chosen the specific data.  
To examine the R2P norm by the UN we have included paragraph 138 and 
139 on Responsibility to Protect of the UN 2005 World Summit Outcome (WSO) 
and the five annual reports on R2P by the Secretary-General as data. Regarding 
the Security Council meeting records regarding the Syrian crisis account as data.  
 
As outlined in the previous chapter, stage two of the method emphasises data 
collection. As underlined earlier our data is collected on the basis of the problem 
statement as it is what frames the research paper and indirectly the research 
questions. Our conclusive findings will depend on the data as the GTM states data 
as the most fundamental part and what the findings emerge from. There are 
different criteria within GTM. One of these is that the research must be grounded 
in the data. This means that there are different standards to the data, which the 
research is founded on. Therefore the data within this research paper vary 
according to the research questions. As the research questions differ on their aim 
they result in a differentiation between the documents concerning the R2P within 
the UN. The WSO and the annual reports are all data explicitly concerned with 
framing the R2P norm, while the meeting records show us how Syria, an R2P-
related crisis, is dealt with in reality. To increase the validity, reliability and 
credibility of our data, and thus the findings of the research, we have emphasised 
the use of primary sources both regarding the UN in general and the permanent 
member states of the UNSC.  
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3.1 Data Regarding the United Nations on R2P 
R2P is a norm that has been developed over several years and by numerous people 
in different contexts. This research paper, however, focuses solely on how it is 
perceived within the UN, thus this has been basis of our data selection. 
Consequently documents that are normally considered core R2P documents are 
left out. One example is the report Responsibility to Protect by the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) from 2001. This is the 
first time that the term ‘responsibility to protect’ is comprehensively developed. 
However as the ICISS was initiated and appointed by the Canadian government, 
and not by an UN appointed working group we have chosen to leave the report 
out of this paper. Further, we have intentionally chosen not to include any data 
from either the General Assembly or the Secretariat regarding specifically the 
Syrian situation. On the contrary we have selected documents describing the 
general R2P norm within the UN. We argue that this is beneficial in enabling us to 
answer the problem statement. As we seek to study the extent to which R2P is 
present in statements of the Security Council’s member states, we first need to 
develop an understanding of the exact content of R2P. We believe that the chosen 
data provides us with this insight.  
 
When studying the R2P within the UN, the document that is most essential is the 
2005 World Summit Outcome (WSO). The R2P is defined in paragraph 138, 139 
and 140. However paragraph 140 will not be included in the data, as it just states 
that the member states support the Special Advisor on prevention of genocide and 
thus not elaborate on the R2P norm itself. The General Assembly adopted the 
World Summit Outcome Document in its resolution 60/1 on 24 October 2005 and 
the UNSC adopted paragraph 138 and 139 in its resolution 1674 on 28 April 
2006. Paragraphs 138 and 139 are then the foundation of the perception of R2P 
within the UN, thus these are included as data in this research paper. The 
remaining paragraphs of the WSO are not included, thus when we refer to the 
WSO it will only be in regard to paragraph 138 and 139. The R2P of the WSO is 
founded on the Charter of the United Nation. Though the importance of the 
Charter of the UN is emphasised in the WSO, the Charter in itself will not be 
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included as data in this research paper. The Charted will be included through the 
annual reports, as the annual reports present thorough elaborations of the WSO, 
and thus also of the R2P in relation to the UN Charter. It must be underlined that 
the Charter will still be referred to in the paper, as it constitutes the frame of R2P 
and intervention in Syria.    
At one hand the WSO is the most precise definition of R2P as states the 
exact aspects of the norm. On the other hand the short definition also makes it a 
broad definition, thus the R2P in the WSO can be interpreted differently. 
Therefore, we have chosen to include further data for the purpose of a thorough 
examination of research question 1. As the question is concerning the UN we have 
chosen to include the annual reports on R2P by the UN Secretary-General. These 
are all taking point of departure in the WSO and elaborating on specific elements 
of paragraph 138 and 139. Thus the annual reports and the WSO are closely 
interlinked. It is, however, important to underline that the WSO is adopted by the 
UN member states, in contrast to the annual reports. Thus they differ in legal 
validity. Though as the Secretary-General is elected by the member states we find 
it reasonable to argue that he, and the entire Secretariat, to some extend represents 
the values of the member states. Furthermore this research paper does not aim to 
study the legitimacy of the actions of the UNSC in regard to Syria, but on the 
contrary to what extend the R2P norm is present in their approaches, and how the 
fear of regime change influences this. Consequently we find it crucial to include 
data that will enable us to unfold the R2P norm of the WSO.     
The Secretariat has published five annual reports since 2009. The report, 
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, was released on the 12
th
 of January 
2009 and was the first comprehensive document on R2P by the Secretariat. The 
second report, Early Warning, Assessment and Responsibility to Protect, was 
released on the 17
th
 of July 2010. The third report, The Role of Regional and Sub-
regional arrangements in implementing the Responsibility to Protect, was 
released on the 27
th
 of June 2011. The forth report, Responsibility to Protect – 
Timely and Decisive Response, was released on the 20
th
 of August 2012. The fifth 
and most recent report, State Responsibility and Prevention, was released on the 
5
th
 of August 2013. The titles of the reports indicate rather precisely what they are 
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regarding, thus we will not go further into depth with the specific reports in this 
chapter. Though, as the reports have separate focal points concerning the R2P it is 
natural if they are not all equally referred to in the analysis, as some of them will 
be more relevant than others. Nevertheless all five reports will be coded, as this 
will give a comprehensive view on the state and the international community 
within the R2P. During the axial coding in chapter 5 it will become clear which 
reports are the most significant to us. 
Though the data has a timespan from the WSO from 2005 to the latest 
annual report of 2013, this is not considered problematic as the data is extremely 
closely interlinked to the UN and the R2P. Both the WSO and the annual reports 
will be included in the analysis, but as the annual reports often and thoroughly 
refer to the WSO, these will constitute the major part. The WSO, however, is 
basis of the in-vivo coding in chapter 4.   
 
3.2 Data Regarding the United Nations Security Council 
There exist numerous UNSC documents and letter exchanges between the 
Security Council and other parts of the UN concerning the crisis in Syria from its 
outbreak in 2011 until today. On this basis we have chosen to limit our collection 
of data as we prioritise being able to make a thorough analysis contrary a broad 
one. This prioritisation is a consequence of our limited timeframe. Thus we have 
chosen the Security Council’s meeting records as data. We argue that this is where 
we get most insight in the actions and statements of the member states. It is, 
though, important to underline that the statements in the meetings can only be 
understood if we have insight in the context they are presented in due to the 
agenda of the specific meeting. The resolutions and draft resolutions are essential 
to the context. Thus we have read these in order to get fully insight of the agenda 
of the meetings. The resolutions illustrate decisions taken by the UNSC as a unity, 
which is not the focus of our problem statement. The resolutions are then included 
to the extend, that the five permanent member state of the Security Council refer 
to them. 
As the UNSC hosts numerous meetings, it has been necessary to delimit 
data on this account. Thus we have only included meetings where draft 
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resolutions are on the agenda. This delimitation is justified in light of the GTM 
approach, which stresses the significance of focussing on the interactionism. We 
perceive that in meeting concerning resolutions the member states are more likely 
to clarify their opinions related to the Syrian crisis, through statements and voting. 
As this research paper is only focusing on the five permanent members of the 
Security Council, a further delimitation has been made within each meeting 
record. Only statements by the permanent members are then considered as data 
and will be coded. Consequently statements by the non-permanent member states, 
the President of the UNSC or representatives from countries or organisations of 
relevance to the agenda will not be considered in this paper. In case a permanent 
member state holds presidency in one of the meetings, the statements are included 
where it is evident that the representative speaks on behalf of his or hers country 
and not as President.  
Since spring 2011 the UNSC has held eight meetings with an agenda of 
specifically the situation in Syria. This is not the same as saying that Syria has not 
been discussed in other meetings as well, however then it has been in a broader 
context, e.g. the general situation of the Middle East or protection of civilians in 
armed conflicts. Due to our limited timeframe and the GTM approach we have 
only selected meetings with a draft resolution regarding Syria. As a result our data 
consists of seven meetings, which are presented in table 1. The remaining 
meeting, of the total eight, is meeting record S/PV.6524 from the 27
th
 of April 
2011. The meeting entails a briefing on the situation in Syria by the Under-
Secretary-General for Political Affairs Lynn Pascoe, followed by remarks from 
the member states. As there is no draft resolution on the agenda it is not included 
as data. 
 
Date of meeting  Meeting  Agenda and outcome  
4
th
 of October 2011  S/PV.6627 Draft resolution S/2011/612 is vetoed by 
China and Russia. 9 votes in favour and 4 
abstentions.   
4
th
 of February 2012 S/PV.6711 Draft resolution S/2012/77 is vetoed by 
China and Russia. 13 votes in favour and 
none abstentions.  
14
th
 of April 2012 S/PV.6751 Resolution S/RES/2042 (2012) is 
unanimously adopted. 
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21
th
 of April 2012 S/PV.6756 Resolution S/RES/2043 (2012) is 
unanimously adopted. 
19
th
 of July 2012 S/PV.6810 Draft resolution S/2012/538 is vetoed by 
China and Russia. 11 votes in favour and 
2 abstentions. 
20
th
 of July 2012 S/PV.6812 Resolution S/RES/2059 (2012) is 
unanimously adopted. 
27
th
 of September 2013 S/PV.7038 Resolution S/RES/2118 (2013) is 
unanimously adopted. 
 
    
 
From table 1 it is evident that the meetings are placed within the timespan from 
the 4
th
 of October 2011 to the 27
th
 of September 2013. Though we do not consider 
this as a remarkable timespan in itself, we must stress that the Syrian conflict has 
escalated rapidly, thus the timespan becomes significant. However, as we expect a 
certain degree of consistency in the statements by the respective member states, 
we argue that this is not a concern for the findings of our paper.  
Furthermore, table 1 show that the outcome of four of the meetings were an 
adopted resolution, contrary the remaining meetings, where the veto right was 
used by both Russia and China on all three issues. By this we expect that the 
statements presented by the member states in the former group of meetings are 
more alike than in the latter group. As the member states are central of the 
analysis, opposed to each meeting, this aspect might not be distinct in the paper, 
though it interesting to reflect upon. 
 
 
Chapter 4 In-vivo Coding 
 
As mentioned in subchapter 2.2, we will in this chapter execute the in-vivo 
coding. Through the in-vivo coding the following two categories will be derived: 
the state and international community.   
As stated in the previous chapter the World Summit Outcome constitutes the 
basis of the in-vivo coding. As the R2P norm within the UN spurs our research, 
Table 1 
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the WSO is evidentially at the core of the research. The WSO contains the 
description of the R2P by the UN member states and thus we argue that it entails 
the most crucial aspects of the R2P norm under the auspices of the UN.   
Though the categories are derived from data closely related to the R2P we 
argue that these also enable us to derive meaning regarding the issue of regime 
change. This issue is closely related to both categories. However as the axial 
coding of the state and the international community is conducted separately in this 
report, we have chosen to illustrate the issue of regime change in relation to the 
international community, as we find it more interlinked with the category of the 
international community that the state.  
 
As described in the methodology chapter the axial coding is the centre of our 
analysis as it enables us to answer our problem statement. Thus the in-vivo coding 
will be the point of departure of the axial coding.  
In-vivo coding is the analytical tool that we use to create categories. 
Categories capture the essence of the data, and are then also understood as 
phenomena (Corbin & Strauss 1998:124f). In the GTM approach there is a 
hierarchy of ideas where the categories are the highest and the broadest ones. 
Beneath the categories there are subcategories, which define the categories. The 
purpose of the research within the GTM is to define the categories and thereby 
understand the field research from a grounded perspective. This is done through 
connecting the subcategories to the categories. The subcategories are therefore 
elements that answer questions about the categories (Corbin & Strauss 1998:125).  
 
4.1 In-vivo Coding of the 2005 World Summit Outcome   
This section will show how the state and international community are derived as 
categories through in-vivo coding. The full text of the WSO is presented in below 
as the coding is conducted directly upon it. Thus every sentence of the text is 
numbered, which enables us to refer to the text as we code.    
 
“138. [1, ed.] Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
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humanity. [2, ed.] This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, 
including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. [3, ed.] We 
accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. [4, ed.] The 
international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to 
exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an 
early warning capability. ” 
(UNGA 2005, para. 138) 
 
Sentence 1 illustrates ‘state’ as a phenomenon, as the content of the sentence, 
‘responsibility to protect’, is linked to ‘state’. The following two sentences 
elaborate on ‘responsibility’, thus ‘state’ is still the overall phenomenon. Sentence 
4 then refers to ‘international community’ as one to help the ‘state’, thus 
‘international community’ is implied as a phenomenon, though it is still linked to 
‘state’.       
 
“139. [5, ed.] The international community, through the United Nations, also has 
the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful 
means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. [6, ed.] In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a 
timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the 
Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with 
relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be 
inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. [7, ed.] We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue 
consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, 
bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. [8, ed.] We 
also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States 
build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
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cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under 
stress before crises and conflicts break out.” 
(UNGA 2005, para. 139) 
 
Sentence 5 refers to ‘international community’ as first thing. The ‘international 
community’ is appointed the same responsibility as ‘state’ in sentence 1, thus it 
becomes evident that ‘international community’ is a phenomenon like ‘state’.  
Sentence 6 and 7 stresses how the ‘international community’ intends to meet the 
responsibility they are assigned in sentence 5, thus ‘international community’ is 
still the overall phenomenon of these two sentences. Sentence 8 refers to the 
interlinked relationship between ‘state’ and ‘international community’ as also 
implied in sentence 4.   
 
Through the in-vivo coding above we have manifested ‘state’ and ‘international 
community’ as the two phenomena within the WSO. Thus these are constituted as 
the categories that will be developed by the axial coding in chapter 5 and chapter 
6.   
From the in-vivo coding it becomes clear that the categories are interlinked, 
which also is an important aspect within the GTM as interaction, as accounted for 
in the methodology chapter, contributes to develop of the categories.  
Through the in-vivo coding subcategories begin to emerge, e.g. 
‘responsibility’, however it is not the aim of the in-vivo coding, thus they are not 
incorporated. The subcategories emerge through stage four, the axial coding, in 
chapter 5 and chapter 6. Due to the fact that the analysis is conducted on the basis 
of the two research questions, the subcategories within the two chapters will not 
be identical. However, the point of departure of the two analysis will be the same, 
hence the categories.  
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Chapter 5 The R2P Norm 
The aim of this chapter is to elaborate on the perception of the R2P within the UN 
on the basis of the two categories; the state and the international community. Thus 
this chapter is directly linked to the first research question of the paper. The 
notion behind elaborating the perception of R2P is linked to the pragmatist 
perspective of GTM, which prescribes that analysis is concerned with the process 
of problem, idea and action. In this regard an elaboration of the mentioned 
categories will allow us to understand the UN-stated idea of R2P, thus further 
understanding the calls for action that follow R2P. 
Before initiating the analysis we have read and discussed the memos of the 
R2P-related data. The analysis is then further undertaken by means of the axial 
coding, identifying subcategories in order to make the main categories as 
developed as possible.   
The chapter is structured according to the original two categories, but the 
different subcategories will be emphasised separately. The category the state has 
less properties and dimensions, than the category of the international community. 
This is due to the fact that the responsibilities of the latter are more complex than 
of the ones of the state.  
At the end of the chapter we will briefly summarise on the R2P norm and 
thereby elaborate on the relationship between the subcategories.  
 
5.1 The State  
As the category of the state refers to the state in relation to its population all other 
references to the role of states have been coded as indication of the international 
community. Thus the role of the state is characterised as a matter of internal 
responsibilities toward the population.   
One of the most important subcategories connected to both the category of 
the state and the international community is: state sovereignty. The perception of 
sovereignty constitute the basis of understanding the role of the respectively the 
state and thus the international community. The R2P is framed within the Charter 
of the UN, thus this is where all external affairs and obligations are stated. The 
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data though stress that all state have a responsibility to assist each other and to 
respond to mass atrocities, but in this research paper these aspects are considered 
under the category of the international community, which is described in the 
section below. Further, this distinction will become more evident through chapter 
6. As the subcategory of state sovereignty is highly important it is firstly outlined 
in this chapter, and then followed by a development of the subcategories: the 
internal responsibilities of the state and the responsibilities of the individual.  
 
State Sovereignty  
In all of the data the state is to some extend defined in relation to the perception of 
sovereignty. Thus it is important to develop the subcategory based on the different 
documents in order to understand the R2P norm fully.  
 
In the first annual report on R2P it is underlined that the responsibility of states is 
to protect its population, which is an obligation that comes with sovereignty. It is 
further stressed that this is nothing new.  
 
“The responsibility derives both from the nature of State sovereignty and from the 
pre-existing and continuing legal obligations of States, not just from the relatively 
recent enunciation and acceptance of the responsibility to protect.”  
(UN 2009, para. 11) 
 
The aim of R2P is then not to dismantle the world order of sovereign states; 
however, as it is also stressed in the 2011 annual report, the R2P is concerned 
about linking state sovereignty with responsibility.    
 
“First and foremost, the responsibility to protect is about reasserting and 
reinforcing the sovereign responsibilities of the State.”  
(UN 2011, para. 10) 
 
The annual reports often refer to existing obligations and the Charter of the UN in 
connection with the debate of sovereignty and world order. Though the R2P norm 
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stresses an obligation of the states to protect the population, the annual report of 
2009 claim that the R2P norm does “not alter, indeed it reinforces, the legal 
obligations of Member States” (UN 2009, para. 3). 
 
Throughout this brief paragraph we have illustrated how the subcategory state 
sovereignty is perceived in the data. It shows that the R2P norm does not 
downplay the importance of state sovereignty. On the contrary the perception of 
sovereignty has become more comprehensive, thus states are described as having 
a “sovereign responsibility to protect” (UN 2012, para. 18). Responsibility to 
protect the population is added as criterion to possessing state sovereignty, and 
thus the description and perception of such responsibilities is the next 
subcategory, which is deeply interconnected with the subcategory of state 
sovereignty. Thus the following paragraph analyse how responsibilities of the 
state is considered in the data.  
 
The Internal Responsibilities of the State 
The overall role of the state in relation to R2P is described in connection to the 
increased articulated responsibility to protect its population. All of our data 
emphasise this responsibility.  
 
Both the WSO and 2013 annual report emphasise that states are the foundation of 
the responsibility to protect as this responsibility is formally assigned to the states 
(UNGA 2005, para. 138-139; UN 2013, para.5, para. 68). The WSO states 
protection as protection from genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes (UNGA 2005, para 138). Furthermore it is stated, in the 2011 
annual report, that prevention of mass atrocities is encompassed in the legal 
responsibilities of the state (UN 2011, para. 12). It is clear from all of our data is 
that there should be no distinction between who is entitled to protection. This is 
especially underlined in the first annual report; “(…) responsibility of the State to 
protect its populations, whether nationals or not (…)” (UN 2009, para. 11). This 
is supported by the claims that “(…) [the state should] provide safe and stable 
conditions for all their populations, irrespective of identity” (UN 2009, para. 46).  
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In the data, especially in the 2013 annual report, the aspect of protection is further 
elaborated in a preventive manner. It is a common understanding in the data that 
the crimes occur as a result of underlying factors (UN 2013, para.5). In the 2012 
annual report it is claimed that R2P-related crimes often are conflicts rooted in 
underlying tensions (UN 2012, para. 6). Thus the responsibility of the state also 
entails ensuring an equal and tolerant domestic society, where such conflicts will 
not spur. It is evident of the following quote.   
 
“(…) the most effective form of prevention lies in constructive management of 
diversity to promote good governance, equality, inclusivity, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and observance of democratic values and 
practices. This is primarily the responsibility of the State (…)”  
(UN 2012, para. 6)  
 
It is important to underline that the in the WSO, adopted by the states, prevention 
is framed as “(…) prevention of such crimes [genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, ed.], including their incitement, through 
appropriate and necessary means” (UNGA 2005, para. 138). The statement above 
is then the Secretariat’s interpretation and elaboration of the WSO. The Secretariat 
refers to “constructive management”. Especially the report of 2013 emphasises 
this aspect. Several policies are presented and it is stated that they “can be 
tailored to the context of each State” (UN 2013, para. 33). As the quote above also 
illustrates the policies are directed at developing strong state capacities and 
promoting human rights (UN 2013, para. 35 and para. 49). As the policies are 
determined by the specific context, e.g. arrangement of the state and the kind of 
crime at risk, the purpose of such policies are prior to the content of them, as the 
aim is to prevent the four R2P-related crimes (UN 2013, para. 30).    
 
The Responsibilities of the Individual  
The civil society is emphasised as having an important role as well. In the 2012 
annual report it is stated that “each individual has some degree of influence and 
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hence a share of responsibility” (UN 2012, para. 47). The national civil society 
organisations possess essential tools and influence to both prevent and respond to 
crimes (UN 2012, para. 46). The civil society can play a part in advocating for the 
implementation of the R2P norm as well as in holding the government 
accountable on the basis of R2P (UN 2012, para. 45). The civil society might 
possess new technologies by which early warnings of conflict can spread 
throughout the population (UN 2012, para. 46). Further, it is underlined that 
individuals are not to engage in any crimes themselves. This two-folded 
responsibility of individuals is evident from the following.     
 
“This includes a responsibility to speak out against intolerance, discrimination 
and incitement, as well as a responsibility not to participate in the commission of 
crimes and violations relating to RtoP.” 
(UN 2012, para. 47) 
 
By this it becomes clear that though the state is a fundamental actor of keeping 
peace and protecting the population, the population also holds an essential 
responsibility in the R2P norm.   
 
5.2 The International Community 
Through this section the other category of the international community is 
developed. The WSO unfolds the responsibility of the international community as 
two-folded; a responsibility to assist the states in meeting their responsibilities and 
a responsibility to respond if the states fail their responsibility. However as the 
Secretariat also points out these are very interlinked.  
 
“It may be argued that the first two pillars of the implementation strategy address 
prevention, and the third, response. The dividing lines are, however, not so clear 
in practice.”  
(UN 2012, para. 11) 
 
Page 36 of 100 
 
 
The impact of both assistance and respond is based on correct and extensive 
information and assessment. Decisions of the UN “should be informed and 
enriched, whenever possible, by local knowledge and perspectives, as well as by 
the input of regional and subregional organizations” (UN 2010, para. 11). Thus 
the states and other actors of the international community are also given the 
responsibility to inform and advise. In this regard especially neighbouring states 
are underlined as they “may have critical and timely information” (UN 2010, para. 
12). In addition the importance of different organs of the UN and the Special 
Advisors is highlighted (UN 2009, para. 6). Though the aspect of assessment is 
extensively unfolded in the data, it will not be elaborated further as it is not the 
aim of this research paper to examine the reliability of the information that 
decisions are taken upon in regard to Syria.  
Likewise, collaboration is the basis of implementing the R2P. It is stated 
that preventive diplomacy is “most effective when different organizations work 
together, speak with one voice” and responses should be based on “collective 
actions” (UN 2009, para. 49; UN 2012, para. 24). This aspect is important in 
underlining that the international community is more than the UN. Though the 
possibilities and impacts of internationals interaction on different levels in regard 
to the crisis in Syria, is not the focus of this research paper. Thus, an elaboration 
on the role of different actors is left out of this chapter. On the other hand, data 
concerning the UNSC is included and elaborated. This is essential to obtain a full 
understanding before studying the different statements of the member states in 
relation the Syrian crisis. 
Consequently, the rest of this chapter will clarify the subcategories; 
Responsibility of the International Community to Assist the State, Responsibility 
of the International Community to Respond and Collaboration and the Security 
Council.  
 
Responsibility of the International Community to Assist the State  
According to the WSO, the role of the international community is to assume some 
of the responsibilities of the state in cases where the state either cannot or will not 
Page 37 of 100 
 
 
live up to these (UNGA 2005, para. 139). This claim is supported in the first 
annual report.  
 
“When a State is unable to fully meet this responsibility, because of capacity 
deficits or lack of territorial control, the international community should be 
prepared to support and assist the State in meeting this core responsibility (…)”  
(UN 2009, para. 13)  
 
Thus the international community plays an important role in the preventive aspect 
of the responsibilities of the state, in assisting with e.g. capacity building. All the 
reports claim this statement. Furthermore they underline that the assistance must 
be of a peaceful and non-coercive sort. In the 2012 report it is for instance stressed 
that “it is not the role of the United Nations to replace the State in meeting those 
responsibilities” (UN 2012 para. 14). Thus the annual report of 2013 elaborates 
that prevention of mass atrocity must be rooted in national efforts and has to have 
an aim of creating a community that is resilient to atrocity crimes (UN 2013, para. 
68). It is important to note that the restriction of non-coercive measures within this 
subcategory defines the limits of how far the international community can go in 
assisting the state. However in case the state is failing to such an extent by which 
the crimes of genocide, ethnic cleansing, crime against humanity and war crimes 
escalate it is stresses that the international community has a responsibility to 
respond (UNGA 2005, para. 139). This is elaborated in the following paragraph.     
 
Responsibility of the International Community to Respond  
This paragraph is concerned with the subcategory: the role of the international 
community in case the state fails to meet its responsibilities.  
We do not intend to go into depth with the difference between whether the 
state fails because it cannot or will not meet its responsibilities. What is important 
is the fact that the international community has a responsibility to respond when a 
state “manifestly fails to protect” (UNGA 2005, para 139). This is framed precise 
in the first annual report where it refers directly to the WSO:  
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“(…) actions, either peaceful or non-peaceful, could be invoked by the 
international community if two conditions are met: (a) “should peaceful means be 
inadequate” and (b) “national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their 
populations (…).”  
(UN 2009 para. 49) 
 
Measures and actions of R2P are based on a case-by-case basis (UN 2009, para. 
49), thus the quote, and of cause the WSO itself, is the complete definition of 
when the international community has a responsibility to respond. Furthermore 
the quote also indicates that actions can be shaped differently. There is a spectrum 
of measures to apply; they range from peaceful to non-peaceful. Though there is a 
consensus that force should only be used as a last resort. This is for instance 
evident of the following quote from the 2012 annual report.     
 
“Enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter is to be contemplated when 
other measures are judged unlikely to succeed or when they have already failed. 
The use of force should be a measure of last resort.” 
(UN 2012, para. 60) 
 
In terms of the peaceful responses, mediation and diplomacy are central (UN 
2012, para. 23). Though these are often applied in response to “a specific pattern 
of events or set of concern”, thus it is framed in a more preventive manner (UN 
2012, para. 11). In case conflicts calls for more radical coercive means, actions 
must be taken through the UNSC; if the crime escalates to such an extent that 
actions of diplomatic or other peaceful means are considered inadequate further 
actions must be authorized by the UNSC under Article 41 and 42 of the Charter as 
the quotation above also illustrates (UN 2009, para. 56; UN 2012, para. 31). Thus 
this section entails a specific paragraph about the UNSC below, as this is another 
important subcategory and a central object of this research paper.   
Such coercive actions are mostly referred to as either sanctions or military 
intervention. In the 2009 annual report sanctions are emphasised; for instance 
targeted sanctions on travel, financial transfers, luxury goods and arms (UN 2009, 
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para. 57). Though it is underlined that sanctions might be insufficient in stopping 
a comprehensive mass atrocity, they can imply that the international community is 
intending to meets its responsibilities of responding. Consequently, military 
intervention is the last resort. Military force can be utilised in different ways. In 
the 2012 report it is exemplified in relation to “the deployment of United Nations-
sanctioned multinational forces for establishing security zones, the imposition of 
no-fly zones, the establishment of a military presence on land and at sea for 
protection or deterrence purposes (…)” (UN 2012, para. 32).   
 
Furthermore the R2P norm entails that the international community has a 
responsibility to hold the persecutors accountable. It is stated that: “responsibility 
requires accountability” (UN 2011, para. 19). By this the Secretariat stresses the 
importance of accountability mechanisms. The reports emphasise the role of the 
International Crime Court (ICC) in relation to accountability on the international 
level (UN 2009, para. 18; UN 2011, para 19). This is an important part of the R2P 
norm, though it does not propose new obligations on this regard, as it is framed 
within already existing law. Thus it is not further elaborated.    
 
Collaboration and the Security Council   
In relation to the preventive part of R2P, where the international community is 
characterised in an assisting manner, especially regional and sub-regional 
arrangements are emphasised (UN 2011, para 3; UN 2013, para. 71). But also the 
civil society and the private sector are stressed (UN 2009, para. 11). The 
collaboration is underlined as a non-coercive relationship between the individual 
state and relevant parts of the international community. However in case the state 
manifestly fails its responsibilities the face of the international community 
changes. Then the international community resorts to “collective actions”, which 
are coercive to different degrees (UN 2009, para 49). Then collaboration is aimed 
at how different parts of the international community must collaborate to respond 
towards the crime. As R2P is to be applied on a case-by-case basis there are no 
strict instructions on collective actions. The annual reports refer to the WSO, 
which claims that actions must be taken “in a timely and decisive manner, through 
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the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” 
(UNGA 2005, para. 139). The UNSC then holds an essential role. Further the 
annual report of 2009 addresses the significance of the right to veto.    
   
“(…) the five permanent members bear particular responsibility because of the 
privileges of tenure and the veto power they have been granted under the Charter. 
I would urge them to refrain from employing or threatening to employ the veto in 
situations of manifest failure to meet obligations relating to the responsibility to 
protect (…)”  
(UN 2009, para. 61) 
 
The role of the UNSC is emphasised in the quote. It becomes evident that if 
current and future mass atrocities are to be halted, when preventive measures fail, 
it is most essential that the members of the Security Council, especially the 
permanent five, act according to the R2P norm. The quote emphasise the need for 
more radical and intrusive actions by the UNSC in cases of mass atrocities.   
 
5.3 Recapitalisation   
This paragraph briefly summarise the essence of the R2P norm within the UN. 
The aim of the chapter was to develop the subcategories of the two categories of 
state and international community, to get a fully understanding of the R2P. Thus, 
this paragraph is concerned with the relationship between the categories and 
subcategories.  
State sovereignty is the foundation of R2P. Thus the specific perception of 
sovereignty influences both the perception state and international community, and 
it is thus a subcategory to both. Even though sovereignty is framed according to 
the Charter of the UN, the R2P norm adds a new criterion to state sovereignty; a 
state must uphold its ‘responsibility to protect’ the population from genocide, 
ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Thus the state is given 
a central role in preventing mass atrocities. The state must ensure that underlying 
tendencies of suppression and inequality are managed before they result in armed 
conflicts. Thus prevention is stressed. In this regard both the individuals and the 
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international community are also stressed as possessing responsibilities. They 
must support the implementation of the R2P and assist the state in meetings its 
responsibility to protect.  
The international community is largely defined as the United Nations, 
hence the member states, but through the axial coding it has become evident that 
the there is more to it; e.g. the civil society, regional and sub-regional 
organisations and actors in the private sector. Collaboration is then of the essence, 
which also provides a strong basis for share of information and assessment.  
If a situation of mass atrocity occurs, it is conceived as the state failing its 
responsibility, and thus the international community has a responsibility to 
respond. However, as R2P is bases on a case-by-case basis there is no threshold to 
when a state is “manifestly failing” its responsibility or not. Nor is there a strict 
guideline to how the international community should respond. It is stressed that 
diplomatic and peaceful measures are preferred, and in regard to collective actions 
the importance of UNSC is emphasised. In case of coercive measures especially 
the Security Council is central.  
 
Chapter 6 Perceptions within the Security Council 
This chapter has two aims; first derive the perceptions of the Syrian crisis, held by 
the individual member states within the UNSC, and second, to relate these 
perceptions to the perception of the R2P norm, presented in chapter 5. The first 
aim is linked to the second research question whereas the second aim is closely 
related to the problem statement. As stated in chapter 5, elaborating the 
perceptions within the UNSC is linked to the pragmatist perspective of GTM, 
which prescribes that analysis is concerned with the process of problem, idea and 
action. In this regard an elaboration of the mentioned categories will allow us to 
understand the UNSC’s idea of the Syrian crisis, and relating this to R2P norm, 
we can understand to what extend this norm is present within the UNSC. 
Additionally, we wish to study the role of regime change within the UNSC, to 
understand its influence on the UNSC member’s perception of how to respond to 
the Syrian conflict. To account for this, we will derive the perception of regime 
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change, as held by the UNSC members, under the category related to the 
international community.  
Throughout the analysis each member state will be thoroughly analysed 
individually, according to the two aims mentioned above. The first part of 
analysing each state will be commenced by developing the two categories; the 
state and the international community, through axial coding. As with the analysis 
in chapter 5, we have read and discussed the memos derived from the meeting 
records of the UNSC. Through the production of memos, the subcategories related 
to each member state, has emerged. The analysis is then undertaken by means of 
axial coding, linking subcategories in order to make the properties and dimensions 
of the main categories as developed as possible – creating more abstract 
categories. This is specifically done by drawing on central statements from the 
UNSC meetings. These statements will relate to the two categories, the 
international community and the state, and thus by linking the statements to these, 
we will elaborate the perception contained within these categories.  
The second part of analysing each member state, will be commenced by 
comparing and discussing the findings from the first part up against the R2P norm 
as accounted for in chapter 5. Through this part of the analysis we seek to 
understand to what extend the R2P norm is present within the UNSC in relation to 
the Syrian conflict, and what role the issue of regime change holds in this context.   
6.1 France 
6.1.1 The Perception of the Syrian Conflict  
The State  
France is the first member state to speak on the first UNSC meeting regarding a 
resolution on Syria. The meeting was held on the 4
th 
of October 2011. The French 
representative Mr Araud made it clear in his speech that the Syrian authorities 
“have lost all its legitimacy by murdering their own people” (UNSC 2011b:3). 
Here he connects the Syrian government’s legitimacy to the killings of its own 
people, suggesting that the Syrian state’s legitimacy was eroded when it started 
killing the Syrian protesters. He stresses that the regime carries the responsibility 
for the escalating crisis:  
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“(…) the regime is continuing its bloody repression of demonstrations, to carry 
out torture, arbitrary arrests, forced disappearances and sexual violence.”  
(UNSC 2012c:3)      
 
Further Mr Araud states that the people of Syria hold “legitimate aspirations that 
have been so bravely expressed” (UNSC 2011b:3). Again he states that they are 
“legitimately demanding to exercise their own fundamental rights” (UNSC 
2011b:2). This allocation of responsibility in regard to the violent conflict is most 
clear when he characterise the Syrian regime as “perpetrators of this barbaric 
repression of a peaceful civilian population” (UNSC 2012b:6). Thus there is no 
doubt that France perceives the regime responsible of the Syrian crisis.  
In regard to the resolution adopted on the meeting on the 14
th
 of April 2012, 
Mr Araud underlines that the Syrian regime is not just to halt the mass atrocities, 
which they are responsible for, the regime must also respect human rights:  
 
“The collective message we are sending today is an appeal for a halt to violence 
in every form — not just heavy artillery but also torture, arbitrary arrests, forced 
disappearances and sexual violence, all of which are violations of human rights 
and have been committed systematically and on a huge scale by the Syrian 
regime’s security forces for 13 months.“ 
(UNSC 2012b:6)  
 
The international community 
In the first meeting on the situation in Syria on the 4
th
 of October 2011 the French 
delegate, Mr Araud, presents the French take on the Syrian conflict. This is 
evident from the statement below:  
 
“Faced with the extreme violence being brought against a population demanding 
to exercise their rights; faced with the deafness of the Syrian authorities; and 
confronted with the risk of regional instability, a united response from the 
international community was, and continues to be, necessary. The Security 
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Council, which has the primary responsibility of maintaining peace and security, 
is therefore the natural spokesperson for the international community.“ 
(UNSC 2011b:2f) 
  
Mr Araud defines the regime as an oppressor and claims that it has refrained from 
initiatives to stop the violence. He then claims that the Syrian situation could 
leave to regional instability, thus the conflict is of interest of the Security Council 
due to its stated purpose.    
As France perceives the Syrian regime as illegitimate and responsible of the 
crisis, France asserts an international response directed at the regime. The French 
delegate underlines that the conflict has reached a point where actions of the 
international community are crucial:  
 
“After so many months of obstruction, Syria must understand the unanimous 
message being sent by the international community as well as the meaning of its 
commitments to put an end to an intolerable situation.”  
(UNSC 2012c:3) 
 
Mr Araud underlines that the internal conflict in Syria, is one of international 
responsibility, to the degree that the Syrian regime fails to stop the mass atrocities. 
 
“If that [Syria fulfilling its commitments, ed.] does not happen, it will be the 
responsibility of all members of the Council to consider the measures that should 
be taken.”  
(UNSC 2012b:6) 
 
Mr Araud points out that both sanctions through the European Union and 
extensive diplomatic efforts by the UNSC have been invoked against the Syrian 
regime, though “the Syrian authorities have remained deaf to those efforts” 
(UNSC 2011b:2). Hence at the following meeting, on 4
th
 of February 2012, Mr 
Araud, underlines that France will continue to “up the pressure by imposing 
further sanctions of the European Union” (UNSC 2012a:4). This elaborates the 
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statement that measures must be taken by the international community to end the 
Syrian crisis. However, France perceives it as a possibility to pressure the Syrian 
regime through other channels than the UNSC. Mr Araud further elaborates on the 
purpose of responses from the international community. He states the objective as: 
 
“(…) to stop the brutal crackdown by the Syrian regime (…) This would create an 
atmosphere free of violence and intimidation and thus allow for the emergence of 
an inclusive political process led by and for the Syrian people.” 
(UNSC 2011b:2) 
 
Mr Araud refers to a political transition, which he several times accounts for as an 
emerging need. At the following meeting on the situation in Syria on 4
th
 of 
February 2012, China and Russia veto draft resolution S/2012/77, and the French 
delegate then stress that “is a sad day for the Council; it is a sad day for the 
Syrians; and it is sad day for all the friends of democracy” (UNSC 2012a:3). Thus 
the aim of a political transition towards democracy is explicit. This becomes 
further obvious at the next meeting on Syria, where resolution 2042 is adopted. 
Mr Araud calls for a united international community to:  
 
“ (…) speak with one voice in response to the Syrian crisis and to contribute to a 
peaceful transition to democracy.”  
(UNSC 2012b:6) 
 
The French delegate elaborates on this, when he refers to the purpose of both 
resolution 2042 and resolution 2043: 
 
“(…) we are not seeking merely to freeze the situation on the ground. The Council 
is supporting Mr Annan’s plan of action, designed to facilitate Syria’s political 
transition to democracy in order to meet the aspirations that the Syrian people 
have so courageously expressed.” 
(UNSC 2012b:6) 
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“I would like to recall that our goal in deploying the Mission is not just an end to 
repression; above all, it is the launching of a political transition in Syria towards 
a democratic system (…). We can wait no longer. More civilians are dying with 
each passing day.”  
(UNSC 2012c:3) 
 
In the two statements Mr Araud frames the need for a political transition in two 
ways. In the first he states that the international community has a responsibility to 
respond and assist the Syrian population in its aspirations. In the second he 
stresses the importance of political transition in relation to the increasing death 
toll. Thus at the meeting on the 19
th
 of July 2012, where China and Russia for the 
third time veto a resolution, the French delegate state that “we must not shirk our 
responsibilities” (UNSC 2012d:4). In the following remark, it becomes further 
illustrated that France has no intention of refraining from its stated responsibility 
to protect the Syrian population from the Syrian regime:    
 
“We will continue to support the Syrian opposition on its road to a democratic 
transition in Syria. In every forum, France is resolved to work unceasingly with 
those who share its values (…)”   
(UNSC 2012d:4) 
 
This stand is present already at the first two meetings on Syria. Here Mr Araud 
states that:  
 
“France, along with all its partners, will not cease its efforts to ensure that the 
rights of the Syrian people are recognized and respected, so that those 
responsible for the violence can one day be brought to justice — and they will — 
and to promote an inclusive, credible political process that can fulfil the 
aspirations that are being expressed daily in Syria.”  
(UNSC 2011b:3) 
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“We have no right to abandon the Syrian people to its tragic fate. I tell the Syrians 
that France will continue to work in all forums and with all partners (…)” 
(UNSC 2012a:4) 
 
Besides the fact that all three statements above clearly illustrate that France 
expresses a responsibility of the international community in relation to the Syrian 
conflict, other aspects become evident as well.  
 
Mr Araud explains that the vetoes invoked by Russia and China are disappointing 
and condemnable, as the critique of the draft resolution are without grounds. He 
explains that there is no ground for the Russian and Chinese allegations that the 
resolution paves the way for military intervention and regime change (UNSC 
2012a:4). This is evident when Mr Araud states that: 
  
” (…) we have been accused of seeking regime change and preparing for military 
intervention. That is patently false. We have fully answered those concerns.”  
    (UNSC 2012a:4) 
 
As presented, Mr Araud on occasion referred to the risk of regional instability. At 
the meeting on the 14
th
 of April 2012 he raises this concern again: “The line 
separating us from the abyss of a civil war or its regional ramifications is a 
narrow one“ (UNSC 2012b:6). Though the Syrian conflict is continuously 
escalating this concern is not further put forward. 
 
6.1.2 The Extend of R2P and the Issue of Regime Change 
The State 
By looking at the French perception of legitimacy in relation to the two parts in 
the conflict, it becomes evident how they perceive the role of the Syrian state in 
the conflict. Mr Araud states that the Syrian authorities “have lost all its 
legitimacy by murdering their own people”. France’s obvious perception of the 
Syrian regime as illegitimate in killing its own people can be said to correlate with 
the perception inherent in the R2P norm. The R2P perception of the state, as put 
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forward in chapter 5 implies that a state has a responsibility to not kill the peoples 
within its territory. The French statement shows that the French government 
shares this perception. To elaborate on this, the basic premise of the R2P norm, as 
shown in chapter 5, is that the people of states must be protected from crimes of 
genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes, a 
responsibility assigned to the state. Thus France is, according to the R2P norm, 
right in perceiving the Syrian regime as responsible for the crisis, a perception, 
which is evident from the statements from the UNSC meetings. 
Additionally, France claims that the Syrian people are “legitimately 
demanding to exercise their own fundamental rights”. This perception, 
accordingly, fits within the perception inherent in the R2P norm. According to the 
R2P norm, as stated in chapter 5, the Syrian authorities would be judged 
responsible for not providing these exact rights in the first place. Thus, according 
to France, the case of Syria is a case of failed prevention of mass atrocities.  
Within the R2P norm, as accounted for in chapter 5, the individual holds a 
responsibility as well as the state, in abstaining from participating in crimes 
relating to R2P. Thus it is possible to argue that the population holds some of the 
responsibility for the crisis, by resorting to violence. However, France does not 
state that this is within their perception of the situation. In turn, they vest al 
responsibilities with the Syrian regime. 
 
The International Community  
The first apparent perception brought forward by the French statements to the 
UNSC, is how the international community has a responsibility to help the Syrian 
population. According to the French delegate, Mr Araud, as the Syrian people is 
being met by violence from the regime in exercising their rights, the international 
community, in the shape of the Security Council, has a responsibility to react.  
This perception is in accordance with the R2P perception, shown in chapter 5, 
where it is stated that the international community assumes the perceived 
responsibilities of the state if it fails in meeting these.  
In relation to the responsibilities of the international community, as 
perceived by the French state, is the responsibility of the international community 
Page 49 of 100 
 
 
to react to the Syrian crisis because it comprises a threat to the regional stability. 
The issue of regional instability is included in the Charter of the United Nations 
under chapter VIII. Thus, calls for international actions in relation hereto, can be 
directed to the Charter. Seeing that the R2P norm refers to this part of the Charter, 
the French perception that the international community should react, to instances 
of threat to regional peace and stability, can be understood as encompassed within 
R2P, although not being central.  
The French call for an international response, to the Syrian crisis, centres 
around a call for intervention. Specifically Mr Araud argues for the need of 
sanctions to the Syrian regime. The French perception; that sanctions should be 
applied to the Syrian case, in order to halt the mass atrocities committed, is in 
coherence with the R2P norm. In chapter 5 we have shown how the R2P norm 
prescribes the application of sanctions in cases of mass atrocity crimes. The idea 
of outside intervention is, in this respect, perceived as legitimate and necessary.  
 In relation to the idea of invoking political pressure, by applying sanctions 
to the regime in Damascus, the French delegate suggests that France will seek to 
apply pressure to the Syrian regime through alternative channels other than the 
UNSC. This strategy of exerting pressure through other forums than the UNSC is 
not included in the R2P norm, which we have put forward in chapter 5. In reverse 
it is specifically stated that all action must go through the Security Council, along 
with the call for a united UNSC in relation to R2P crimes, which is additionally 
called for by the French delegate.  
The French calls for sanctions, which are vetoed by Russia and China, could 
easily be perceived as what spurs the idea of seeking backing from other forums 
than the Security Council. In relation to this is the French critique of those 
members of the UNSC who applies their vetoes to block the sanctions, which 
France perceives as necessary to halt the conflict. The French critique of the use 
of veto is in line with the R2P norm contained in chapter 5, where it is clarified 
that UNSC members should abstain from using their veto rights in cases of mass 
atrocity crimes.  
One of the reasons given for the use of veto to halt resolutions is that it was 
perceived as a pretext for military intervention and, consequently, regime change. 
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The French envoy denies this allegation and further denies that France would have 
any intentions in pursuing military intervention or regime change in Syria. This 
allegation, concerning a French wish for regime change, is, however, not entirely 
unjustified. On several meetings, the in the UNSC, Mr Araud states the French 
aspirations for a political transition for the Syrian people. Seeing that the French 
envoy openly declares French support for the Syrian opposition, referring to the 
fact that they share the same values as France, along with the obvious Syrian 
discontent with the regime, it seems likely that the French are actually pushing for 
regime change. With regard to the R2P norm shown in chapter 5, regime change 
should not be the aim of intervention by the international community. Reversely 
the international community has a responsibility to protect populations from mass 
atrocities, not to start political transitions or invoke regime change within states. 
In this respect France can be perceived to be crossing the limits of actions in 
relation to the R2P norm. However, as the R2P norm is based on a case-by-case 
basis and as actions are to be taken in a “timely and decisive manner” it is possible 
to argue that if the French government perceives a regime change as the only way 
to protect the population of Syria it could be perceived as within the R2P norm. 
This is, however, to be seen in relation to the statement in chapter 5 that the 
United Nations is not “to replace the State”.  
6.2 Russian Federation 
6.2.1 The Perception of the Syrian Conflict 
The state  
In several meetings, the Russian representative to the UNSC, Mr Churkin 
expresses the importance of committing to the sovereignty of Syria. This is 
exemplified in the UNSC meeting on the 4th of October 2011. Here he puts 
emphasis on the Russian respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
preference for the principle of non-intervention, which he feels should govern the 
UNSC’s response to the Syrian crisis (UNSC 2011b:3). Furthermore, the Russian 
representative states that the Russians have agitated for a formulation in the 
resolution on Syria that stated the “non-acceptability of foreign military 
intervention” (UNSC 2011b:4). 
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“Based on respect for Syria’s sovereignty, we have cautioned against destructive 
attempts at external interference and against imposing any kind of illusory fixes.” 
(UNSC 2012b:3) 
 
In the quote above, Mr Churkin again underlines the Russian opinion that it would 
be a breach of Syria’s sovereignty, to exert external pressure on Syria. It is thus 
obvious that the respect for the sovereignty the Syrian states is central. However, 
at the same meeting Russia votes in favour of a resolution, giving mandate to 
sending an observer mission to Syria. Russia had changes made to the resolution, 
making it more considerate of the sovereignty of the Syrian state. Mr Churkin 
says; 
 
“On the initiative of Russia and a number of other members of the Council, the 
initial draft resolution underwent substantive changes to make it more balanced, 
appropriately reflect realities and take into account the prerogatives of the Syrian 
Government in receiving the observer mission on its territory.” 
(UNSC 2012b:3) 
 
In general the Russian delegate to the UNSC is very occupied with protecting the 
sovereignty of the Syrian state. However, that does not mean, that he overlooks 
the violence committed in Syrian, nevertheless the blame is not put solely on the 
regime; 
 
“With respect to Syria, we are not advocates of the Al-Assad regime. We believe 
that the violence is unacceptable, and we condemn the repression of protests by 
peaceful demonstrators. However, the continuation of this tragedy cannot be 
blamed only on the harsh actions of the authorities.”  
(UNSC 2011b:4) 
 
Consequently, the Russian delegation widens the responsibility for the conflict to 
include both the opposition as well as the Syrian government. This is also evident, 
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when the Russian representative states that one of the main reasons for the 
Russian vetoes has been the bias inherent in the draft-resolutions; only targeting 
the Syrian regime. Mr Churkin argues that this is wrong because violent members 
of the Syrian opposition “(…)have been pushing their own geopolitical intentions, 
which have nothing in common with the legitimate interests of the Syrian 
people”(UNSC 2012d:8). Additionally the Russian delegate argues that the 
international community should demand of the Syrian opposition that: “(…) there 
should be an end to attacks by armed groups on State institutions and 
neighbourhoods.” (UNSC 2012a:9). This supports the notion that Russia 
perceives the armed Syrian oppositions uprising as illegitimate in its militant 
resistance of the Syrian state.  
 
Moreover, the representative distances himself and Russia from the arguments of, 
for instance, France who aligns the Syrian regime’s violent behaviour towards 
their population with a loss of legitimacy. Instead Mr Churkin states that: 
 
“Given the basis of statements by some Western politicians on President Al-
Assad’s loss of legitimacy, such an approach could trigger a full-fledged conflict 
in Syria and destabilization in the region as a whole.” 
(UNSC 2011b:4) 
 
The international community  
At the UNSC meeting on the 19
th
 of July 2012, the Russian delegate clearly states 
that Russia perceives the western states to have an agenda of military intervention 
in regards to Syria. He furthermore says of the western states that:  
 
“Their [the western UNSC members, ed.] calculations to use the Security Council 
of the United Nations to further their plans of imposing their own designs on 
sovereign States will not prevail.”  
(UNSC 2012d:8)  
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This clearly shows the Russian scepticism towards the western agenda and 
interestingly criticises that the western UNSC members suggested actions to 
thwart the Syrian crisis is a challenge to state sovereignty. Such statements leave 
the impression that Russia favours a role of the international community, which 
does not include interference in sovereign matters. 
Instead of intervention the Russian non-confrontational strategy towards 
the Syrian regime, calls for an inclusive political process of negotiations (UNSC 
2011b:3f.). At the UNSC meeting on the 4
th
 of October 2011, where Russia 
vetoed a resolution for the first time during the Syrian conflict, Mr Churkin 
expresses concern that the proposed draft-resolution S/2011/612 could be a step 
towards military intervention in Syria. He clearly states that, in the Russian 
perception, the resolution was based on “(…) the philosophy of confrontation.” 
(UNSC 2011b:3). He then goes on to refer to the Russian and Chinese resolution 
draft, that was not put to vote; 
 
“Of vital importance is the fact that at the heart of the Russian and Chinese draft 
was the logic of respect for the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Syria as well as the principle of non-intervention, including military, in its affairs; 
the principle of the unity of the Syrian people; refraining from confrontation; and 
inviting all to an even-handed and comprehensive dialogue aimed at achieving 
civil peace and national agreement by reforming the socio- economic and 
political life of the country.” 
(UNSC 2011b:3) 
 
Here he firmly states, that sovereignty is of great importance and that intervention 
or confrontation is to be desisted from. Instead he argues that dialogue is what 
should solve the conflict. At the same meeting he argues that the Russian 
delegation “cannot agree with this unilateral, accusatory bent against Damascus” 
and that they “deem unacceptable the threat of an ultimatum and sanctions 
against the Syrian authorities” (UNSC 2011b:3).  
This is again made clear at a later UNSC meeting on the 19
th
 of July 2012: 
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“The Russian delegation had very clearly and consistently explained that we 
simply cannot accept a document, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations, that would open the way for the pressure of sanctions and later for 
external military involvement in Syrian domestic affairs.” 
(UNSC 2012d:8) 
 
This leaves the clear impression that the Russian state does not perceive the role 
of the international community, in relation to Syria, as one of intervention or 
diplomatic pressure.  
 
At the first UNSC meeting regarding Syria, on the 4
th
 of October 2011, Mr 
Churkin expresses distinct worry over the role of NATO, in relation to the 
implementation of the UNSC resolution in Libya. He specifically makes a 
connection between the Libyan and the Syrian situation:  
 
“The situation in Syria cannot be considered in the Council separately from the 
Libyan experience. The international community is alarmed by statements that 
compliance with Security Council resolutions on Libya in the NATO 
interpretation is a model for the future actions of NATO in implementing the 
responsibility to protect.”  
(UNSC 2011b:4)  
 
This statement clarifies that the Russian government is reluctant to issue 
resolutions that refer to the Responsibility to Protect because of NATO’s 
interpretation of its mandate during the intervention in Libya – effectively leading 
to the fall of Gaddafi’s government.  
At the UNSC meeting on the 4
th
 of February 2012, where Russia and 
China applied their vetoes, for the second time in relation to the Syrian crisis, Mr 
Churkin likewise argues that the confrontational approach, which the draft 
proposed, is counterproductive to solving the Syrian crisis (UNSC 2012a:9). He 
claims that the international community and the states representing the approach 
contained within the resolution “have undermined any possibility of a political 
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settlement, calling for regime change, encouraging the opposition towards power, 
indulging in provocation and nurturing the armed struggle”(UNSC 2012a:9). 
This statement both points to that the Russians perceive the language of the 
resolution as encouragement to the opposition, which we will return to. But 
moreover the statement expresses the Russian perception that parts of the 
international community have expressed a desire for regime change. In opposition 
to this approach Mr Churkin expresses the Russian hopes that:  
 
“(…)intensive efforts of the international community will be continued, with a 
view to an immediate end to the violence and a successful beginning and 
conclusion of an inclusive Syrian political process and to withdrawal of that 
country from a profound crisis.” 
(UNSC 2012a:9) 
 
Mr Churkin’s perception, that the draft’s confrontational approach is an 
encouragement to the Syrian opposition, is repeated at the next UNSC meeting 
regarding Syria on the 14
th
 of April 2012. Here, he states that the reason for the 
Russian support of resolution S/RES/2042 is partly due to its inclusion of a clear 
division of responsibilities relating to all Syrian parties, not only the Al-Assad 
regime: 
 
“We supported today’s Security Council resolution owing to the need for a rapid 
deployment to Syria of the United Nations advance observer mission. The 
resolution addresses requirements both for the Government of Syria and for 
opposition groups to fully cooperate with monitors and fulfil the Annan six-point 
proposals.” 
(UNSC 2012b:3) 
 
Thus, it is very clear, that the Russian understanding of the Syrian crisis is that the 
international community should not hold the Syrian government as the sole 
responsible for the crisis. Additionally, at the UNSC meeting on the 4
th
 of October 
2011, the Russian delegate emphasises the need for the international community, 
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to take into account that not all Syrians agree with the move towards changes to 
their country (UNSC 2011b:4).   
 
As the Russian representative argues that confrontation, in forms of external 
interference along with taking sides in the conflict, is destructive, he instead calls 
for a dialogical approach. Churkin tells, that one reason for the veto to the 
resolution draft S/2012/77 was that Russia wanted “the proposal to show more 
flexibility for the intermediary efforts of the League of Arab States, which would 
increase the chances for the success of an inclusive Syrian political process” 
(UNSC 2012a:9. Thus, for Russia the role of the international community, this 
time in the form of the Arab League, is one of diplomacy and mediation. At the 
meeting on the 14
th
 of April 2012, the Russian delegate seems to have altered this 
perception as he argues that: 
 
“Russia has firmly and consistently called for the non-use of force by all parties 
and has emphasized the need for a political solution to the problems confronting 
the country through an inclusive political dialogue conducted by the Syrians 
themselves.” 
(UNSC 2012b:3) 
 
Through this statement Mr Churkin suggests that the international community 
should stay out of the political dialogue and let the Syrian parties handle this 
themselves.  
 
6.2.2 The Extend of R2P and the Issue of Regime Change 
The state 
By deriving the Russian perception of the state, in relation to the Syrian conflict, it 
has become clear that there are some differences between the Russian perception 
of the state and that inherent in the R2P norm.   
The Russian perception of the state, in relation to Syria, is clearly guided 
by the respect for territorial sovereignty. This is evident as the Russian delegate, 
on several occasions, stresses the Russian inclination towards respecting the 
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sovereignty of the Syrian state, and abstaining from every measure, beyond 
dialogue, that could halt the conflict within Syria. The respect for sovereignty is 
also inherent in the R2P norm, however, this perception, does not regard the state 
as sovereign if it fails its inherent responsibilities, by for example, committing 
mass atrocities or disturbing the peace and security in its region. Specifically, 
Russia perceives the Syrian state’s sovereignty as a shield from outside 
interference. This comprises the principle of non-intervention in any aspect, 
neither diplomatically nor militarily. The R2P norm, as pointed out in chapter 5, 
establishes military intervention as the very last of possibilities, but, nonetheless, 
it is a possibility if all others have been exhausted. In relation to other forms of 
intervention, for example diplomatic in the form of sanctions, the R2P norm is 
less cautious and suggests these as preceding military intervention. Thus Russia’s 
perception of sovereignty differentiates from the one inherent in the R2P norm.  
 
Another subject, touched upon by the Russian delegate is the shared responsibility 
between the state and the Syrian opposition. The Russian delegate stresses that the 
responsibility of the Syrian conflict is divided between the opposition and the 
regime. He frames the violent actions of the regime as unacceptable, and the 
actions commenced by the opposition as illegitimate.  
In the R2P norm from chapter 5 it is stressed that the responsibility of R2P 
related incidents should not necessarily be solely placed with the state. Inherent in 
this perception is that all individuals carry responsibilities, to not exert violence. 
Thus the Russian inclination to share the responsibility, for the Syrian crisis, 
between the Al-Assad regime and the opposition groups is consistent with the 
content of the R2P norm from chapter 5. 
 
The International Community 
The Russian perception of the Syrian state, greatly influences the perception of 
the international community in relation to the Syrian crisis. Thus their perception 
of sovereignty makes Russia a strong advocate of non-intervention. This is 
evident as Russia opposes both diplomatic and military interventions as means to 
halt the Syrian conflict. Instead, Russia prescribes an inclusive political dialogue, 
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where both sides of the Syrian conflict are heard. This is what the Russians work 
towards until the final meetings, where the Russian delegate suggests that the 
international community should leave negotiations to the Syrians themselves.  
As already stated, the R2P norm revolves around the perception of a broader 
sovereignty, adding on the weight of responsibilities. This also entails that the 
international community has an inherent responsibility towards populations of 
other sovereign states. In the Russian rejection of almost all kinds of international 
involvement in the Syrian conflict, the Russian perception of the role of the 
international community, in relation to R2P related conflicts, places itself outside 
of the R2P norm. The redefinition of sovereignty inherent in the R2P norm is 
incompatible with the Russian perception sovereignty as territorial sovereignty. 
This is a sign that the Russian government has not adopted the most central 
perspective of the R2P norm in the case of Syria – that sovereignty is dependent 
on responsibilities and does not constitute a shield against outside intervention. 
Calls for dialogue between the parties, is not a measure within the R2P norm 
stated in chapter 5. This is likely due to the fact that voluntary negotiations is not 
perceived as conflicting with state sovereignty, which is why it is not included in 
a perception that deals with such measures. Thus the Russian perception of the 
international community’s role in relation to halting the Syrian conflict is not 
reconcilable with the perception of R2P in chapter 5. 
 
The reason for Russia’s reluctance towards international interference, and 
especially international interference through coercive measures, is likely to be 
found in the Russian perception of the agenda of the western states on the 
Council, in relation to the preceding intervention in Libya.  
Throughout the UNSC meetings, related to the Syrian conflict, the Russian 
representative is vocal about the Russian concerns regarding the western UNSC 
members’ reasons for wanting to intervene in the Syrian crisis. The Russian 
perception holds that the Western wish for intervention is merely a pretext for 
imposing a regime change. This concern is clearly stated as related to the Libyan 
case, where an UNSC adopted resolution led to the fall of the Libyan government. 
This concern is accordingly stated as the reason that Russia is reluctant towards 
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resolutions that refer to the R2P norm. It seems likely that the Russian perception 
of state sovereignty as inviolable and their subsequent reluctance towards 
intervention in the Syrian conflict is related to their fear of regime change, which 
is connected to the intervention made in Libya.  
 
6.3 China 
6.3.1 The Perception of the Syrian Conflict 
The State 
Like the other members of the Security Council the Chinese delegate is worried 
about the developments in Syria (UNSC 2011b:5). In this respect China urges 
“(…) the various parties in Syria to exercise restraint and to avoid more 
bloodshed and all forms of violence” (UNSC 2011b:5). The Chinese delegate goes 
on to say at the meeting the 4
th
 February 2012 that dialogue and negotiations 
should be the primary focus point within Syria and that this should lead the way 
towards a peaceful solution in Syria that could restore stability within the country 
(UNSC 2012a:9). Furthermore the delegate emphasis: 
 
“We call on all parties in Syria to stop the violence and in particular to avoid 
casualties among innocent civilians, to restore order in the country as soon as 
possible and to respect the request of the Syrian people for reform and for the 
safeguarding of their own interests” 
(UNSC 2012a:9) 
 
In the statement above the Chinese delegate emphasises that nothing good will 
come of the violence within Syria. In addition to this the delegate state that the 
dispute within Syria should be dealt with by the Syrians. Furthermore the 
representative argues that the request for reform should be respected, this imply 
that the population of Syria have a say in the Syrian agenda. However at the same 
time Mr Li Baodong emphasis that: 
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“(…) the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Syria should be 
fully respected.”  
(UNSC 2012a:9).    
 
Throughout the Security Council meetings, concerning Syria, the Chinese 
representative claims that the sovereignty of states should be respected. In 
addition to this the delegate emphasises that other countries should not interfere in 
the internal affairs of a state (UNSC 2011b:5). This implies that internal affairs of 
states are a national matter. This inclination to respect state sovereignty is in fact 
restated throughout all the Security Council meetings concerning the Syrian crisis 
(UNSC 2011b:5, UNSC 2012a:9, UNSC 20012b:8, UNSC 2012c:4, UNSC 
2012d:13, UNSC 2013:9). In elaboration of this point, the Chinese representative 
refers to the United Nations Charter as the source of the Chinese stance: 
 
“(…) sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of other 
countries are the basic norms governing inter-State relations enshrined in the 
Charter of the United Nations. China has no self-interest in the Syrian issue. We 
have consistently maintained that the future and fate of Syria should be 
independently decided by the Syrian people, rather than imposed by outside 
forces.”  
(UNSC 2012d:13) 
 
Furthermore this statement shows that the Chinese government places it upon the 
Syrian people to solve the crisis, without interference from the outside.  
The fact that China continuously emphasises the importance of respecting 
the sovereignty of Syria, applying the Charter as a base for this argument, 
suggests that the Chinese government still considers Syria as a sovereign state. . 
 
The international Community 
In relation to the emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference, the Chinese 
perception of what actions the international community can apply to the Syrian 
conflict, is very much dependent on their perception of the sovereignty of the 
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Syrian state. This is evident in that the Chinese delegate, Mr Li Baodong, 
continuously emphasises that respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and preference for the principle of non-intervention, should govern the UNSC’s 
relations to Syria. Talking of the Security Council Mr Li Baodong states that:  
 
“In the meantime, it [the UNSC] should fully respect Syria’s sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity. Whether the Security Council takes further 
action on the question of Syria should depend upon whether it would facilitate the 
easing of tension in Syria, help to defuse differences through political dialogue 
and contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in the Middle East.” 
 (UNSC 2011b:5).  
 
In stating the above, Mr Li Baodong clarifies that any actions, coming from the 
UNSC, in relation to the Syrian crisis, should be related to political dialogue and 
maintains the peace and stability in the Middle East. In the meeting on the 4
th
 of 
October 2011, the Chinese representative distances his state from the idea of 
applying diplomatic pressure onto the Syrian regime, through invoking sanctions 
(UNSC 2011b:5). The Chinese delegate, Mr Li Baodong, states that the 
confrontational approach of some UNSC-members is not respecting the core 
principles of the UN Charter, thus China cannot vote in favour of the draft-
resolutions (UNSC 2012a:9). In the instances that the Chinese delegate votes in 
favour of resolutions, the emphasis on sovereignty is still present:  
 
“We hope that the advance team will fully respect Syria’s sovereignty, act in strict 
accordance with the mandate of the Security Council (…)”  
(UNSC 2012b:4) 
 
At the meeting on the 21
st
 of April 2012 where the Security Council adopts a new 
resolution concerning the Syrian crisis, the Chinese representative again 
emphasises the importance of the international community respecting the 
sovereignty of the Syrian state: 
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“We hope that the Supervision Mission will fully respect Syria’s sovereignty and 
dignity, act strictly in accordance with what the Security Council has authorized 
(…).” 
(UNSC 2012c:8) 
 
Instead of a confrontational strategy towards the Syrian authorities the Chinese 
delegate argues for the establishment of political dialogue and respect for 
sovereignty, by pointing to the draft-resolution sponsored by China: 
 
“One, which China supports, advocates respect for the sovereignty of Syria and 
resolving the crisis there through political dialogue.”  
(UNSC 2011b:5) 
 
The Chinese delegate states China will participate in resolving the Syrian 
question, although only through mediation: 
 
“Along with the international community, China is willing to play a positive and 
constructive role in appropriately resolving the question of Syria. We will 
continue to support the mediation efforts of the relevant countries and 
organizations in the region.” 
 (UNSC 2011b:5). 
 
Thus the Chinese government seems to perceive the role of the international 
community, in relation to the Syrian crisis, as one of involvement, but only 
involvement through mediation. This role is further elaborated at the meeting on 
the 21
st
 of April 2012: 
 
“We have always supported and are actively committed to promoting a just, 
peaceful and proper settlement of the Syrian crisis through political dialogue.” 
(UNSC 2012c:8) 
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Developing this approach further, Mr Li Baodong, shuns the notion of military 
intervention as a means to solving the conflict: 
 
“We believe that the Syrian issue must be resolved through political means and 
that military means would achieve nothing.” 
(UNSC 2012d:13) 
 
At the UNSC meeting on the 19
th
 of July 2012, the Chinese representative 
distances the Chinese perception from that of other state’s on the Security 
Council, by claiming that others, in their perception of the role of the international 
community: 
 
“(…) have been eager to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries (…)”  
 (UNSC 2012d:14) 
 
This statement properly illustrates how the Chinese delegate, as established above, 
highly disapproves and advise against an approach to the crises that does not take 
full consideration of the Chinese perception of sovereignty. At the UNSC meeting 
on the 4
th
 of February, the Chinese delegate declares that confronting the Syrian 
government, without fully respecting the country’s sovereignty, may only 
complicate matters further, instead of helping to resolve the crisis (UNSC 2012a).   
Overall, the Chinese perception of the role of the international community, 
in the case of the Syrian crisis, is as mediator of political dialog. Thereby the 
Chinese reject interference, which compromises the Syrian sovereignty and 
advocates an approach of non-military means and without the use of diplomatic 
pressure. 
 
6.3.2 The Extend of R2P and the Issue of Regime Change  
The State 
Throughout the UNSC meetings, concerning the Syrian crisis, the Chinese 
representative emphasises that the Chinese government assigns massive 
importance to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Syrian 
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state. These are the decisive factors in the Chinese perception of the Syrian crisis. 
Maybe as a result of this, the Chinese representative reveals very little else about 
the Chinese perception of the state in relation to the mass atrocities committed in 
Syria. Basically the Chinese representative reduces the Chinese view of the state 
to be within the framework of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. 
The Chinese representative, on numerous occasions, refers to the UN Charter as 
the foundation for the Chinese perception of the state. 
Regarding the R2P norm in chapter 5, the Chinese perception of the state is 
both within this perception and removed from it. This is to be understood in the 
way that the R2P norm is constructed around the UN Charter’s perception of 
sovereignty, but as stated seeks to widen this. Looking at the Chinese perception 
we argue that it revolves around the perception of sovereignty as stated in the 
Charter. That the Chinese delegates prioritises sovereignty of the Syrian state, 
suggests that abiding to the value of sovereignty is superior to halting mass 
atrocity crimes within the sovereign territory of other states. This tells us that the 
perception of R2P, as stated in chapter 5, is not represented to a great extend 
within the Chinese perception of the state in relation to the Syrian crisis.  
 
Additionally, relating to the Chinese perception of the Syrian state in relation to 
the conflict, the Chinese representative states that the Syrian people should decide 
the future of Syria and that their request for reform should be respected.  
This comes close to correlating with the perception of the state inherent in 
the R2P norm. The R2P norm carries an aspiration of removing all root causes 
leading to mass atrocities. We argue that in not heeding the Syrian peoples call for 
reform, the Syrian regime has created traction for the rebellion. Thus the Chinese 
delegate’s call for the Syrian regime to respect the Syrian people’s demands for 
reform is within the scope of the R2P norm.  
  
When it comes to placing the responsibility of the crisis, the Chinese 
representative does not decisively choose sides. Rather Mr Li Baodong calls for 
all parties to cease the violent actions. We argue that this can be viewed as 
representing the R2P norm, as the R2P norm assigns responsibility to all parties 
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involved in violent conduct. Furthermore the call for a cessation of the violent 
actions is the fundamental aim of R2P.  
In addition, the Chinese representative emphasises political dialogue 
between the parties of the conflict. Like in the case of Russia, this is not enshrined 
within the R2P norm, because it is not perceived as an action that compromises 
the sovereignty of states. This exact fact can explain the Chinese inclination 
towards political dialogue. As already stated China emphasises state sovereignty 
as a primary concern. 
 
The international community  
The Chinese preoccupation with national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-
intervention defines the perception of the role of the international community in 
relation to the Syrian crisis. The Chinese delegate repeatedly stresses that any 
action commenced through the UNSC should be governed by respect for these 
values. Thus these values define the specific actions proposed by China in relation 
to the international community’s relation to the Syrian crisis. Thus we argue that 
the Chinese perception revolves around the virtues of state sovereignty and non-
interference as stated in the UN Charter. In order to not repeat ourselves, we will 
shortly state that the Chinese perception of the role of the international 
community, in relation to the Syrian crisis, is derived from the Charter of the 
United Nations, while not agreeing to any notable parts of the R2P norm. We 
argue that this explains the Chinese demand that actions undertaken by the UNSC 
should be within the scope of political dialogue. More specifically it is clarified 
that China wishes to play a role in resolving the conflict, by supporting other 
regional actors’ mediation efforts.  
This correlates with the Chinese perception of which actions the 
international community should abstain from in relation to Syria. Mr Li Baodong 
claims that “other states” have been eager to interfere in the internal affairs of 
others. This remark suggests that China is in opposition to any outside 
interference, in the matters of sovereign states. In relation hereto the Chinese 
delegate emphasises that the international community should abstain from 
applying diplomatic pressure to the Syrian state. In this regard it is clarified that 
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China does not perceive sanctions to Damascus as a possible tool for halting the 
Syrian conflict. Additionally, Mr Li Baodong, states that the Chinese will accept 
no military measures within the scope of UNSC sponsored actions.  
In this regard, the Chinese government’s perception of the role of the 
international community, in relation to the Syrian conflict, is not in correlation 
with the R2P norm. This is apparent as the Chinese rejects any actions that 
amount to a substantial pressure to the Syrian state. In rejecting both sanctions and 
military intervention, while criticising the notion of other states interfering in the 
matters of others, the Chinese perception does not allow for any of the prescribed 
actions contained within the scope of R2P. Although the R2P norm does not give 
carte blanche to military intervention, outright denying this possibility, along with 
diplomatic pressure, China rejects any means of applying coercive pressure to the 
Syrian parties.  
 
6.4 United Kingdom 
6.4.1 The Perceptions of the Syrian Conflict 
The State 
The British delegate, Sir Mark Lyall Grant, states his concerns regarding the 
situation in Syria, at the first meeting concerning the Syrian crisis on the 4
th
 of 
October 2011, (UNSC 2011b:7). The expressions of concern relates to the way in 
which the Syrian regime has reacted towards the uprising:  
 
“(…) the situation has deteriorated further. The regime continues to brutally 
repress its people. It has killed almost three thousand civilians. It has used 
disproportionate force and has arbitrarily detained many thousands of people. Its 
actions may amount to crimes against humanity.” 
(UNSC 2011b:7) 
 
Through this statement, Sir Grant, claims that the Syrian regime is committing 
crimes against humanity, thus connecting the Al-Assad regime to mass atrocities. 
In the above statement the British delegate, additionally, holds the Syrian regime 
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responsible for the mass atrocity crimes committed. The Syrian government’s 
responsibility is further emphasised at the meeting on the 14
th
 of April 2012, when 
the British delegate states:  
 
“(…) the Syrian people have for more than one year suffered unimaginable 
brutality at the hands of a regime that has prioritized its own survival over the 
needs, rights and aspirations of the people it should serve and protect.” 
(UNSC 2012b:2) 
 
This is evidence of a British perception that the role of the state is to protect and 
to serve its peoples, while recognising their rights, needs and aspirations. In 
elaboration of this Sir Grant, at the Security Council meeting on the 4
th
 of 
February 2012, characterises the Syrian opposition’s aspirations as legitimate and 
therefore something that should be governed (UNSC 2012a:7).  
Nevertheless the British delegate does not put the blame solely on the 
Syrian regime but also on the opposition, when stating: “We called on all sides to 
reject violence and extremism.“ (UNSC 2011b:7). This is again evident when Sir 
Grant states that:  
 
“The opposition, too, must refrain from violence and ensure that it gives the 
regime no excuse to renege on its commitments (…)“ 
(UNSC 2012b:2) 
 
Moving on, the British delegate claims that the Syrian government has a 
responsibility to fulfil its obligations to the international community, especially in 
relation to the obligations within the resolutions regarding the crisis in Syria 
(UNSC 2012c:6). This will be further elaborated in the following paragraph 
regarding the international community.  
 
Throughout the Security Council meetings regarding the Syrian crisis, it has 
become evident that the British government perceives the Syrian state as 
responsible or the mass atrocities committed within Syria. The British delegate, 
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however, does not abstain from assigning some of the responsibility to the Syrian 
opposition. Additionally, the aspirations of the Syrian people, which has sparked 
the conflict, are deemed legitimate. 
 
The International Community 
The British delegate Sir Mark Lyall Grant is unequivocal in stating the British 
regard of the responsibility of the international community. The Security Council 
meeting on the 4
th
 October 2011 he states: 
 
“If the situation continues as it is, this Council will have to shoulder its 
responsibilities and take the tough action (…)“ 
(UNSC 2011b:7) 
 
In stating the above, Sir Grant, clarifies that the international community should 
play a role in relation to the Syrian conflict. Specifically this responsibility 
amounts to halting the crimes committed by the Syrian government. Furthermore 
Sir Grant suggests that, in order to live up to this responsibility, the Security 
Council may need to invoke “tough action”. Accordingly the British 
representative suggests that the international community, through the UNSC, 
should come together in order to apply collective pressure the Syrian government 
to halt the violence:  
 
“In an attempt to maintain the unity of this Council, for the past few weeks we 
have therefore been engaged in intensive negotiations aimed at ensuring that the 
Council could at least send a strong signal to the Syrian regime to stop the 
violence. “ 
(UNSC 2011b:7) 
 
In relation to the wish of a united Security Council, agreeing to pressurise the 
Syrian Government, Sir Grant states his disappointment in the UNSC members 
who have vetoed a resolution regarding the Syrian conflict. At the meeting on the 
4
th
 of February 2012, he states that these UNSC members: 
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“(…) have failed in their responsibility as permanent members of the Security 
Council, and they have done so on the most shameful of days of the Syrian killing 
machine’s three hundred days of oppression. “ 
(UNSC 2012a:7) 
 
The British delegate further elaborates that his government disapproves of the use 
of veto in the case of Syria: 
 
“The United Kingdom is appalled by the decision of Russia and China to veto an 
otherwise consensus resolution (…)” 
(UNSC 2012a:6) 
 
That the delegate perceives the Security Council as holding a central place in 
regards to the Syrian crisis becomes clear in the following statement:  
 
“It is deeply regrettable that the Council has been unable today to play the role 
for which it was established and is duty-bound to fulfil.” 
(UNSC 2012d:3). 
 
In addition to this the delegate emphasises that the Security Council members 
should “show their support for their [the Syrian people] struggle for basic human 
rights that most populations of the countries around this table enjoy” (UNSC 
2011b:7). This point first of all shows the British inclination towards human 
rights, but furthermore assigns legitimacy to the Syrian peoples struggle for these. 
Calling upon the other council members to show support for this struggle, the 
British delegate is suggesting that the UNSC should assign legitimacy to such 
struggles too.  
 
In relation to the actions that the British government perceives as legitimate in 
relation to the Syrian state, Sir Grant state that, if the Syrian governments cannot 
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or choose not to fulfil its obligations to the international community, sanctions 
should be applied: 
 
”Continued failure of the [Syrian ed.] regime to meet its commitments or any 
attempt to hinder the work of the Mission must be met with robust sanctions by the 
Council.” 
(UNSC 2012c:6) 
 
As this statement illustrates, the United Kingdom considers sanctions as a 
legitimate response in case the Syrian government fails its perceived obligations. 
At the UNSC meeting on the 19
th
 of July the British delegate states that: 
 
“The events in Damascus over the past 48 hours demonstrate the need for urgent 
and decisive action by the Security Council” 
(UNSC 2012d:2) 
  
By this the delegate is stressing the fact that the Security Council should act in 
determination to halt the crimes committed by the Syrian government (UNSC 
2012d:2).  
 
Furthermore, The British delegate states that the British government sees it as 
essential that Syria undergoes political change:  
 
“(…) achieve the political transition that is the only way forward for Syria. “ 
(UNSC 2012d:3). 
 
This is elaborated, when Sir Grant stresses that when the violence have ceased 
“(…) all parties must move quickly to engage in a Syrian-led political transition 
that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people.” (UNSC 2012b:2). 
Here Sir Grant elaborates on the British perception of what the outcome of the 
Syrian crisis should be. Curiously, Sir Grant, on a previous occasion, commented 
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on the worry of some states, that a vetoed draft resolution was designed to open 
up for regime change:   
 
“From the outset it [the draft resolution] had support from the vast majority of 
Council members and had the backing of the Arab League. Yet some Council 
members argued that the draft resolution imposed regime change. It said no such 
thing. “ 
(UNSC 2012a:7) 
Here Sir Grant denies all allegations that the discussed draft resolution was a 
pretext for regime change. In relation to this, he later accommodates some of the 
criticism, which has been expressed by Russia and China, as their reasons for 
vetoing the proposed draft resolution at the UNSC meeting on the 19
th
 of July 
2012:   
 
“They argued that a Chapter VII draft resolution was somehow designed to seek 
military action through the back door. Those arguments are irrational. The 
Council has adopted many Chapter VII resolutions, most recently on the Sudan 
and South Sudan. Today’s draft resolution, like that one, was set under Article 41. 
It was not under Article 42 of the Charter and could not therefore be construed as 
a precursor to military intervention.” 
(UNSC 2012d:3) 
 
This remark by the British representative suggests that there is no hidden agenda 
for enforcing a political transition through military means. He does so by referring 
to the charter and making parallels to both Sudan and South Sudan where, in both 
cases, military intervention was not initiated, although the relevant resolutions 
were drafted from the same chapters in the United Nations Charter. When making 
a distinction between article 41 and 42, where article 42 gives opportunity for 
military action, it seems clear that the resolution could not have open up for for a 
military intervention. In relation to the application of the veto-rights, the British 
representative, at the same UNSC meeting on the 19
th
 of July 2012, states that the 
Security Council members who invoked the veto: 
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”(…) have failed the people of Syria for the third time, blocked an attempt by the 
majority of the Council and supported by most of the international community to 
try a new approach. The effect of their actions will be to protect a brutal regime. 
They have chosen to put their national interests ahead of the lives of millions of 
Syrians.”  
(UNSC 2012d:3)  
 
Through this statement it becomes clear that the British government perceives it 
as highly problematic that UNSC member-states, by use of Veto, obstructs the 
UNSC from taking necessary action towards the Syrian crises. 
 
6.4.2 The Extent of R2P and the Issue of Regime Change  
The State 
In his statements, at the Security Council meetings concerning the Syrian crisis, 
the British delegate implies that the Syrian government is guilty of committing 
crimes against humanity. We argue that this framing of the Syrian situation, 
suggests that the British government has adopted the emphasis on mass atrocity 
crimes contained within the R2P norm. The British representative blames the 
Syrian regime for not fulfilling its role as the server and protector of the Syrian 
people. This implies that the British government considers it the responsibility of 
the Syrian state to do exactly that. This line of thought is consistent with the R2P 
norm, which places a responsibility upon the state to protect its people and to not 
commit mass atrocities against it. Thereby the British representative’s allegations 
towards the Syrian regime are justifiable within the scope of the R2P norm. 
 
Furthermore, the British delegate is not entirely unequivocal in distributing the 
responsibility of the Syrian crisis. This is to be understood in that he additionally 
calls on the Syrian opposition to halt its violent actions in order to suspend the 
crisis. This draws parallels to the thought of individual responsibilities contained 
within the R2P norm. The R2P norm clearly prescribes that individuals are not to 
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engage in violent crimes. It is, however, clear that the British delegate is more 
prone to stress the responsibilities of the Syrian regime, than of the opposition.  
 
The International Community 
The British delegate calls for a responsible UNSC. Sir Grant claims that the 
UNSC has an inherent responsibility to issue action towards the Syrian crisis in 
order to stop the violence. This approach implies that the British government 
perceives the international community as having a responsibility, which compels 
it to halt the crisis unfolding in Syria. Such a view of the international community 
is consistent with the R2P norm, which prescribes that the international 
community carries a responsibility towards populations of states, where the 
authorities are manifestly failing their responsibilities to protect. As we have 
illustrated, the British delegate states that the Syrian crisis constitutes a case of 
mass atrocities, where the state is failing to fulfil the commitments that it has 
towards the peoples of Syria. Thus it can be argued that the British government’s 
perception of the international community, as bound by responsibilities, fits 
within the R2P scope. 
Moreover the British delegate proposes the UNSC to send a strong signal to 
the regime in Damascus. Thus the British perception prescribes that a united 
Security Council issues collective action in response to the Syrian crisis. In 
addition Sir Grant asks for tough action to be exerted towards the Syrian 
government. The actions put forward by the British delegate are within the scope 
of sanctions. Thus, the British perception of the international community, once 
again, seems to be in accordance with the R2P norm, which prescribes that the 
UNSC issues collective action to halt mass atrocities committed in states, where 
the authorities fail their responsibilities. Within the R2P norm, one way of 
intervening is through the issuing of sanctions, which are preferred to military 
intervention and are framed as an early step, where preventive measures have 
failed and mass atrocities are committed. The British delegate specifically calls 
for sanctions to be invoked if the Syrian regime does not comply with the UNSC 
sponsored resolution, demanding a complete stop to the violent acts. The R2P 
norm does not prescribe any distinct action to be issued in circumstances where a 
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state fails to comply with international resolutions. However, the R2P norm was 
constructed to halt the violence committed by states, and so, if the Syrian regime 
fails to bring an end to the violence, the R2P norm prescribes decisive action, e.g. 
through sanctions.  
 
An issue, which is also touched upon by the British delegate is the fact that both 
China and Russia have decided to apply their vetoes to obstruct the UNSC in 
sanctioning the Syrian regime. Sir Grant is very vocal in stating his country’s 
opposition to such acts, obstructing the majority of the Council from initiating 
actions halting mass atrocity crimes. This approach to the veto-right, namely that 
it should not be issued in order to hinder such action, fits within the R2P norm, 
which prescribes that states abstain from applying their vetoes to do exactly that. 
 
A final point, which will be touched upon, is the British call for a political 
transition to take place in Syria. Through the British statements to the Council, it 
is clear that the British perception is that the Syrian conflict should end in a 
political transition, which accommodates the aspirations of the Syrian people. 
Such a notion is not contained within the scope of R2P, which solely looks at 
reactions to halt mass atrocities, without going into detail about what outcomes 
could entail, apart from a cessation of violence. However, the notion of a political 
transition, to meet the demands of a population, can be seen as entailed within the 
preventive scopes of the R2P norm. In its preventive scope, the R2P norm 
contains the aim of accommodating the will of the people, in order to prevent 
situations of mass atrocities from occurring.  
In relation to the notion of political transition, the British delegate argues 
that a particular draft resolution was not a pretext for regime change. We argue 
that although the resolution might not have been a pretext for regime change, the 
continuous mention of a political transition in accommodation of the Syrian 
peoples aspirations, does indicate aspirations for regime change, as Al-Assad’s 
regime does not seem to accommodate the aspirations of the Syrians, hence the 
emergence of the crisis.  
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6.5 United States of America 
6.5.1 The Perception of the Syrian Conflict  
The State 
At the first UNSC meeting concerning a resolution regarding the Syrian crisis, on 
the 4
th
 of October 2011, the American representative Ms Rice talks of the Syrian 
state’s handling of the escalating crisis within its territory. In doing so, she firstly 
recount the Al-Assad regime’s actions towards the Syrian people by labelling 
these as “deliberately unleashed violence, torture” (UNSC 2011b:8). The 
American perception of the Syrian state’s role in relation to the crisis is further 
developed at the meeting on the 14
th
 of April 2012, when Ms Rice connects the 
government in Damascus with “brutal violence” inflicted on its own people, along 
with “grotesque destruction”, “murderous policies” and “years of murderous 
rampage” (UNSC 2012b:9). That the responsibility, for the mass atrocities 
committed in Syria, lies with the state is supported by the assertion that follows 
this statement, where Ms Rice emphasise how peaceful protesters were met with 
violence by their own government, and again commands the Syrian government to 
“(…) end the violence” (UNSC 2012b:9). Again connecting the Syrian 
government with responsibility, Ms Rice states that it is responsible for the 
unstable security situation. Thus implying that the state is responsible for the 
violence and insecurity, which characterises the Syrian situation: 
 
“(…) the very Government that is responsible for the main security threats.”  
(UNSC 2012c:10) 
 
Furthermore she emphasises that the actions of the Syrian state might be 
perceived as crimes against humanity in stating that: 
 
“The High Commissioner for Human Rights has already warned that the Syrian 
Government’s appalling actions might amount to crimes against humanity.”  
(UNSC 2011b:8) 
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In connection to Ms Rice’s framing of the Syrian government’s actions as human 
rights violations, she clearly states the United States’ opinion towards the actions 
undertaken by the regime in Damascus: 
 
“In August, we clearly condemned the violence and made clear that the Syrian 
regime’s repression is utterly unacceptable.”  
(UNSC 2011b:9) 
 
After establishing that the United States perceives the Syrian regime’s actions 
against the Syrian protesters as unacceptable repression and possible human rights 
violations, committed against peaceful protesters and human rights defenders, Ms 
Rice goes on to connect the Syrian state to international obligations, obligations 
that the regime refuses to live up to: 
 
“The Al-Assad regime flatly refuses to meet its international obligations (...)” 
(UNSC 2011b:9) 
 
This connection of the Syrian state to obligations is continued at the 6751
st
 
meeting in the UNSC, regarding the resolution S/RES/2042. Here the American 
representative, Ms Rice, talks of the Syrian state in relation to its peoples and 
again states that the Syrian state must comply with its obligations, this time 
articulated as commitments. She specifically demands that:  
 
“The Syrian Government must meet all of its commitments, not only the bare 
minimum. It must do so now. The suffering of the Syrian people has gone on far 
too long.   
      
     (UNSC 2012b:9) 
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In continuation of this, when Ms Rice calls for an end to the Syrian government’s 
exercise of violence against the people of Syria, she emphasises that the Syrian 
people:  
 
“(…) must be allowed to exercise their rights and freedoms peacefully, without 
fear of attack, detention, torture or death.”  
  (UNSC 2012b:9) 
 
This statement comes in continuation of Ms Rice’s unambiguous account of the 
Al-Assad regime’s violence against civilians, terming it “an outrageous 
escalation of violence” (UNSC 2012b:9). In this way Ms Rice puts pressure on the 
Syrian regime to end the violence, by connecting the violent deeds of the regime, 
to the rights of the Syrian people, letting it be understood that the killings of 
civilians is in opposition to a free people, exercising its rights.  
In addition, the American representative, through a statement directed at the 
UN Joint Special Envoy, connects legitimate governance with ending the 
violence, together with respect for the rights of the Syrian people:  
 
“(…) stop the violence, respect the rights of the Syrian people and begin a 
transition towards stable and legitimate governance.”   
(UNSC 2012b:10) 
 
This suggests that the United States, perceives a legitimate government as 
irreconcilable with violence and non-respect for the rights that the American 
representative ascribes to the Syrian people. Accordingly the statement brings 
across the message that the ruling Syrian governance is not one of legitimacy.  
At the meeting on the 21
st
 of April 2012, Ms Rice further develops the 
American understanding of the Syrian state, once again pointing to its obligations. 
This is seen when she asks the Syrian government to:  
 
“(…) honour all its obligations, including a sustained cessation of violence (…)”  
(UNSC 2012c:10)  
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The International Community  
In the UNSC meeting, on the 4
th
 of October 2011, the United States’ delegate Ms 
Rice talks to the member states in the wake of veto of resolution 612, and 
connects the UNSC with responsibilities:  
 
“The United States believes it is past time for this Council to assume its 
responsibilities and impose tough, targeted sanctions and an arms embargo on 
the Assad regime (…).“ 
(UNSC 2011b:8) 
 
This perception is repeated at the meeting on the 4
th
 of February 2012 (UNSC 
2012a:5). Here Ms Rice’s articulation of the role of the UNSC shows the 
American perception of the international community in regards to Syria. She links 
the UNSC with responsibility of issuing sanctions and embargoes towards the 
Syrian state. The perception of an international community with responsibilities is 
repeated, when Ms Rice claims that the UNSC is failing its responsibilities, in not 
adopting the resolution:   
 
“In failing to adopt the draft resolution before us, the Council has squandered an 
opportunity to shoulder its responsibilities to the Syrian people.”  
(UNSC 2011b:9) 
 
That the international community has a responsibility, is stated by the American 
Secretary of State, John Kerry, when the UNSC adopted resolution S/RES/2118 
relating to the destruction of the Syrian stock of chemical weapons:  
 
“As a community of nations, we reaffirm our responsibility to defend the 
defenceless,”  
(UNSC 2012:4) 
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Here Mr Kerry articulates a perception of an international responsibility to defend 
civilians. In this particular case this statement is as aimed at the Al-Assad regime, 
warning that the United States and the international community acknowledges its 
responsibility towards the Syrian people. In addition to this, the American 
delegate Ms Rice, expands on the role of the international community in relation 
to the Syrian crisis, at the meeting on the 4
th
 of February 2012: 
 
“The international community must protect the Syrian people from that abhorrent 
brutality.”  
(UNSC 2012a:5) 
 
In this statement Ms Rice is referring to the Syrian government’s violent attacks 
on civilian Syrians. In connecting this with the international community, she 
clarifies that the international community should adopt the role as protector of the 
Syrian people.  
 
In relation to the notion of responsibilities is the perception that the international 
community should hold the Syrian state to account for its actions. At the UNSC-
meeting on the 21
st
 of April 2012, Ms Rice makes it clear that the international 
community, constituted by the UNSC, must hold the Syrian government to 
account, if the Syrian people are not given rights: 
 
“If that hope does not materialize, however, the failure will be the Syrian 
Government’s, and it must be held accountable. And we must be prepared to do 
so, given the Al-Assad regime’s track record to date.“ 
 (UNSC 2012c:10) 
 
At the meeting on the 4
th
 of October 2011, Ms Rice develops the notion that the 
international community must react to the Syrian crisis through the UNSC: 
 
“The arguments against strong Council action grow weaker and weaker by the 
day.”  
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(UNSC 2011b:8) 
 
Relating to this the United States assigns the international community a role in 
halting the Syrian crisis at the 6756
th
 meeting on April 21
st
, 2012, where Ms Rice 
calls for external pressure to the Syrian government: 
 
“What can bring a halt to that murderous rampage is continued and intensified 
external pressure on the Al-Assad regime.”  
(UNSC 2012c:10) 
 
Ms Rice on a later UNSC-meeting touches upon what external pressure could 
amount to, in order to change the situation and prevent the regime from killing the 
Syrian people. Here Ms Rice talks of the draft resolution S/2012/538, which was 
voted for by the US, but in the end vetoed by Russia and China:  
 
“(…) It [the vetoed draft resolution ed.] also threatened (…) the Syrian regime, 
with sanctions if it continued to use those weapons brutally against its own cities 
and citizens.”  
(UNSC 2012d:10) 
 
It can be concluded, from this statement, that the United States in voting for the 
resolution, perceives it as legitimate to impose sanctions to the Syrian state in 
order to pressure it into changing behaviour. 
Furthermore Ms Rice articulates her country’s disappointment that the 
UNSC failed to react to the crisis in Syria, because members applied their vetoes 
to resolution S/2011/612. In this instance the American delegate frames the Syrian 
situation as a threat to the regional peace and security, which is covered by 
Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
“The United States is outraged that this Council has utterly failed to address an 
urgent moral challenge and a growing threat to regional peace and security.”  
(UNSC 2011b:8) 
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This same perception is repeated at the meeting on the 4
th
 of February 2012, 
clarifying that the American government is a proponent of a forceful UNSC as the 
central instigator of reaction to the Syrian crisis (UNSC 2012a:5). The statement, 
in this regard, underlines an American opposition towards the enactment of the 
veto, which is also brought forward at the meeting on the 19
th
 of July 2012. Here 
Ms Rice juxtaposes the UNSC-members, who have employed their veto right, 
with the Syrian regime, blaming these states, for the violence, which permeates 
Syria:  
 
“(…) the fault lies squarely with the heinous Al-Assad regime and those Member 
States that refuse to join the international community and their fellow Council 
members in taking firm action against the regime.”  
(UNSC 2012d:10) 
 
Ms Rice further develops her country’s perception of those states that obstructed 
the enactment of resolution S/2011/612, namely that those states are in opposition 
to values like democracy and in support of totalitarian regimes: 
 
“During this season of change, the people of the Middle East can now see clearly 
which nations have chosen to ignore their calls for democracy and instead prop 
up desperate, cruel dictators.“ 
(UNSC 2011b:8) 
 
The statement shows the perception that the international community should act to 
secure democracy, liberty and human rights in Syria. Seeing that Ms Rice 
perceives the non-support of the resolution as direct opposition to democracy, she 
must perceive the resolution as a proponent of this. Looking at the vetoed 
resolution, it does contain strong elements of democratic rights (UNSC RES 
2011:2). As that the American representative voted for the resolution she must 
perceive the international community as a champion of democracy in Syria. The 
exact same statement is repeated at the meeting on the 4
th
 of February 2012.  
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Returning to the American call for UNSC-driven action, Ms Rice rejects alleged 
concerns that it would constitute a pretext for military intervention in Syria: 
  
“Others claim that strong Security Council action on Syria would merely be a 
pretext for military intervention. Let there be no doubt: this is not about military 
intervention; this is not about Libya.”  
(UNSC 2011b:8) 
 
In this way Ms Rice claims that a reaction by the international community, to the 
crisis in Syria, would not entail military intervention leading to regime-change 
like it did in Libya.  
At the meeting on the 14
th
 of April 2012, the Council agreed to resolution 
S/RES/2042. On the grounds of this Ms Rice again talks of the responsibilities of 
the UNSC in saying that the resolution constitutes a step towards the Security 
Council living up to its responsibilities: 
 
“The Council has authorized an advance group of monitors to verify the Syrian 
Government’s compliance. In doing so, the Council has taken a step towards 
fulfilling its own responsibilities. And it is about time.”  
(UNSC 2012b:9) 
 
In stating this, the American representative once again reveals that The United 
States perceives the UNSC as possessing responsibilities. In relation to the 
American perceptions of responsibilities in relation to the Syrian crisis, Ms Rice 
states that:  
 
“The United States expresses its appreciation once again to Joint Special Envoy 
Kofi Annan for his dedicated work to try to stop the violence, respect the rights of 
the Syrian people and begin a transition towards stable and legitimate 
governance.”  
(UNSC 2012b:10) 
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In acknowledging the work of the UN sponsored Joint Special Envoy, she 
specifically mentions the creation of “a transition towards stable and legitimate 
governance”. This leaves the impression that the American delegate is not only 
interested in stopping the ongoing violence, which Al-Assad’s government is 
authorising. In praising the Joint Special Envoy for beginning a transition towards 
legitimate governance, she could be understood as implicitly declaring her 
country’s support for a regime-change in Syria. This can be seen in that the 
American representative, as stated above, in the same meeting, perceives the 
Syrian regime as illegitimate due to its violent retaliation towards its own people. 
There is of course the possibility that the American government perceives it as a 
possibility to keep the Al-Assad regime in power, while invoking reforms creating 
legitimate governance. However, this seems highly unlikely given the situation. 
The statement brought forward by John Kerry, at the 7038
th
 meeting of the UNSC 
on September 27
th
 2013, further supports this argument. Here he states that the 
adopted resolution, calls for a transfer of power to a transitional government, thus: 
  
“(…) paving the way for democratic elections and a Government that can be 
chosen by the people of Syria to represent the people of Syria.” 
(UNSC 2013:5) 
 
In relation to the alleged American inclination towards more explicit action 
towards the Syrian regime, is the following statement from the meeting on April 
21
st
 2012: 
 
 
“The Syrian Government has ignored the Council. In the United States, our 
patience is exhausted. (…) We will not wait 90 days to pursue measures against 
the Syrian Government if it continues to violate its commitments or obstruct the 
monitors’ work.”  
(UNSC 2012c:10) 
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Here Ms Rice clarifies that her government perceives it as a possibility to enact 
measures that lie beyond those, which have been agreed to by the UNSC 
members. One can only guess what such measures could be, but it seems clear 
that the representative is talking about measures that would exert a greater 
pressure to the Syrian government, than what it was subjected too through the 
resolutions. This suggestion should of course be viewed in the light of the 
statement presented earlier, where Ms Rice, at the same meeting, talks of 
“intensified external pressure” as a means to stop the Syrian government from 
killing the Syrian people (UNSC 2012c:10). In correlation with the above, the 
American representative repeats this rhetoric on the following UNSC-meeting on 
July 19
th
 2012, where she states:  
 
“It is simply not credible to argue that the mere continuation of an unarmed 
observer mission in the midst of these threats and spiralling violence can or will 
fundamentally change anything.” 
(UNSC 2012d:11) 
 
From here Ms Rice goes on to talk about how an unarmed observer mission to 
Syria is not sufficient, and how the United States will, instead seek alliances 
outside of the UNSC to pressurise Al-Assad (UNSC 2012d:11). The clear-cut 
perception, which can be derived from this is that the American government is not 
contempt with the measures employed by the UNSC and, in relation to earlier 
statements, push for more decisive action. Ms Rice seems to go even further, 
when she states that the United States and their allies are willing to invoke the 
actions that are required, if the Syrian authorities do not end the killings of 
civilians:  
 
“Yet let there be no doubt: we, our allies and others in this body are planning and 
preparing for those actions that will be required of all of us if the Al-Assad regime 
persists in the slaughter of the Syrian people.” 
(UNSC 2012c:10) 
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6.5.2 The Extend of R2P and the Issue of Regime Change  
The state 
In regard to the violent perpetrations by the Syrian regime, Ms Rice frames these 
in terms that connect them to the types of crimes that are perceived as unjust 
within the R2P norm, as accounted for in chapter 5. This is evident when she, in a 
repetition of the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ words, blames the Syrian 
regime for perusing actions that “might amount to crimes against humanity”. 
Suggesting such perpetrations, the American delegate frames the Syrian conflict, 
as a case where mass atrocities are committed by the regime. Thus the American 
government perceives the Syrian crisis as a case within the R2P framework.  
 
Within the R2P norm it is clearly stated that the sovereign states of the world has 
inherent responsibilities concerning their peoples. We argue that the American 
perception of the Syrian state fits within this R2P aspect. This can be seen when 
the American representative calls for the Syrian government to live up to its 
responsibilities by halting the violence against its own people, calling this 
unacceptable. Furthermore the American representative expands her country’s 
perception of the Syrian government as illegitimate due to its violent actions and 
overruling of rights, which permeates the behaviour of the state. One of the main 
points contained within the UN perception of sovereign states is exactly that a 
state should protect the rights of its people and that it should not kill or otherwise 
commit mass atrocities against the people within the borders.  
 
The R2P perception extracted in chapter 5 additionally contains the notion that all 
individuals carry a responsibility. This is to say that although the state may not 
commit mass atrocity crimes against its people, the people also carry an inherent 
responsibility to abstain from such actions. This is however not a part of the 
American representatives articulations of Syrian crisis. Instead Ms Rice is very 
clearly stating that the responsibility to halt the violence lies with the state, and 
otherwise articulating the people of Syria as peaceful protesters. We argue, that in 
this way the United States fail to address the responsibilities of the armed 
opposition, which is applying violent measures to overthrow the government. In 
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this way the American perception of the Syrian crisis does not entirely correlates 
with the R2P norm.  
 
Furthermore, the American government perceives the Syrian state to have 
additional responsibilities beyond its state boundaries. International responsibility 
is also captured within the R2P norm as it refers to the UN Charter. Ms Rice 
clearly states that she perceives the Syrian crisis as a threat to regional peace and 
stability, thus she call for actions of the UNSC to accommodate this threat. 
Consequently we argue that there is concordance between the United States’ 
perceptions of the international responsibility of Syria and the perception 
contained within the R2P norm in this regard.  
  
The international community 
The American government assigns responsibilities to the international community 
in relation to the Syrian people, as the Syrian state has failed its responsibility to 
protect. This is evident when the American delegate, on numerous occasions, 
encourages the members of the Security Council to assume their responsibilities 
by protecting the Syrians against the violent actions of the regime. In this regard 
Ms Rice suggests that the UNSC has a responsibility beyond sending monitors to 
Syria. Through the speeches it becomes clear that the American government 
perceives the responsibility of the UNSC to include sanctions and embargoes to 
the Syrian regime. Ms Rice demands an intensified external pressure on the Al-
Assad regime, by specifically calling for sanctions and embargoes to the Syrian 
regime in order to stop it from killing the Syrian protesters. This demand for 
action continues as the American representative states that her government is 
impatient and unsatisfied with what the UNSC has amounted to in terms of 
actions. Specifically Ms Rice shuns the notion that unarmed observers can change 
anything and at one point reveals that the Americans are contemplating to take 
action beyond what the UNSC can agree to authorise.  
The perception that the international community has a responsibility to 
protect is one of the cornerstones of the R2P norm, as illustrated in chapter 5. It is 
emphasised that in cases where mass atrocities occur, the international community 
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has an inherent responsibility to protect those subjected to such crimes. Any 
chosen action should be commenced through the UNSC and additionally; 
sanctions and embargoes are legitimate measures, although their legitimacy duly 
depends on the situation and is a matter of assessment, related to the notion of 
“timely and decisive action”. We therefore argue that Ms Rice’s call for sanctions 
through the UNSC correlates with the R2P norm. What is, however, problematic 
of the American statements, in relation to the R2P norm, is the threat of exerting 
pressure through actions that lie beyond what has been agreed to within the 
UNSC. From our findings of the R2P perception, all action regarding R2P related 
crises should be agreed on and commenced through the Security Council, thus 
excluding the possibility of reacting by unauthorised actions, commenced through 
alliances outside of the Council.  
 
In continuation of the American calls for a more dynamic Security Council as a 
proponent for action and pressure towards the Syrian regime, Ms Rice critiques 
those members of the Council who obstructs decisions leading in this direction. 
Openly vocal about the Russian and Chinese decisions to prevent suggested draft-
resolutions from being enacted, by making use of their veto rights, the American 
representative attacks these decisions.  
This critique of the use of vetoes to avert the Council from applying 
additional pressure to the Syrian government can be seen in accordance with the 
R2P norm. From the R2P perception, which we have derived in chapter 5 it is 
clearly stated that the permanent members of the UNSC should refrain from 
exercising this right in situations where states fail their responsibility to protect. 
This is however ignored by China and Russia and thus we argue that the 
American criticism of the application of vetoes, in this particular case, lies within 
the scope of R2P. However, we must underline that this claim is based on the 
perception that the Syrian regime does in fact “manifestly fail” its responsibilities.  
 
A final point that will be touched upon in this chapter is the role of regime 
change. In the American contributions to the debate on Syria, the American 
representative denies the notion that the United States government contemplates 
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military intervention to stop the Syrian conflict. At the same time, Ms Rice rejects 
the comparison between Syria and Libya, which through military intervention, led 
to regime change. In this way the American representative seeks to refute the 
allegations that UNSC action would lead to a replacement of the Al-Assad 
regime.  
In this way the American perception of UNSC action stays within the R2P 
norm. The idea of R2P contains the notion that prevention of mass atrocities is 
most effectively secured through such values as democracy and respect for human 
rights, but referring to R2P does not legitimise coercive actions that advocate such 
values. Thus we argue that although R2P contains the possibility of invoking 
actions to halt mass atrocity crimes, it does not prescribe actions that lead to an 
outcome beyond this.  
We will argue however, that it is understandable why the American 
statements could give rise to concerns of whether the action called for by the 
Americans is a pretext for regime change. Throughout the American statements 
Ms Rice articulates a wish for a transition towards legitimate governance. As 
already stated above, the American government’s perception of legitimate 
governance is highly unlikely to include the Al-Assad regime, seeing that it is not 
a proponent for democracy. However, this is only additional factors on top of the 
all-encompassing issue; that the Al-Assad regime is manifestly failing its 
responsibilities by violently oppressing its people and committing mass atrocity 
crimes. In this relation it is thus evident that the American call for action with the 
aim of creating a democratic Syria that abide to human rights, goes beyond the 
limits of R2P-prescribed action.  
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Chapter 7 Merged Perceptions of R2P and Regime Change  
In this chapter we will merge the perceptions, of the five UNSC member states, 
relating to the Syrian crisis. Relating these perceptions to each subcategory of the 
R2P norm, will give rise to a final understanding of the member states’ 
perceptions in relation to R2P. Thus we can discuss to what extend R2P is present 
within these perceptions. This will clarify what role regime change has in regard 
to the extent of R2P’s presence in the perceptions of the Syrian conflict. 
We will structure this chapter on the basis of the subcategories from chapter 
5, however leaving out the category related to Responsibility of the International 
Community to Assist the State. This is due to the fact that the member states do 
not express any perceptions relating to this subcategory. We argue that this is due 
to the advanced state of the Syrian conflict, which is perceived to be beyond the 
point where assisting the Syrian regime is perceived as neither legitimate nor 
constructive. Additionally, the issue of regime change will be derived in relation 
to the subcategory of Responsibility of the International Community to Respond, 
as these aspects are interlinked.     
 
State Sovereignty  
Throughout the UNSC meetings, China and Russia are the only member states, 
which are primarily concerned with state sovereignty and thus the only members 
explicitly concerned with this aspect. Both states stress the importance of 
sovereignty, here exemplified by China: “(…) the sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity of Syria should be fully respected.” (UNSC 2012a:9). It is, in 
this regard, evident that the Chinese perception of sovereignty is highly influenced 
by the UN Charter. The Russian perception of the Syrian state is also affected by 
their inclination towards sovereignty: “Based on respect for Syria’s sovereignty, 
we have cautioned against destructive attempts at external interference and 
against imposing any kind of illusory fixes.”(UNSC 2012b:3). 
The remaining UNSC members do not address any perceptions of 
sovereignty in relation to the Syrian state. On the contrary they fail to mention this 
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issue entirely. This, we argue, indicates that these states do not perceive the 
sovereignty of the Syrian state as a legitimate barrier against intervention. This 
can be connected to their perception that Syria constitutes an R2P related case. 
In conclusion it is ambiguous to what extend the perception of state 
sovereignty, inherent within the R2P norm, is present within the members states’ 
perception of the Syrian crisis. The Russian and Chinese perceptions of state 
sovereignty correlate with the idea of sovereignty, inherent in the UN Charter, 
which the R2P builds on. However, both state’s preoccupation with sovereignty 
suggests that the R2P norm is not represented within their perception of the Syrian 
crisis. When it comes to the UK, America and France, their failure of relating to 
the sovereignty of Syria, in their dealings with the Syrian crisis, suggests that they 
perceive the sovereignty of Syria, as eroded due to its failure in meeting its 
responsibilities.  
 
Internal Responsibilities of the State 
The French, American and British perceptions of the internal responsibilities of 
the state correlate with the perception held within the R2P norm, in that they all 
perceive the Syrian state as having responsibilities to protect the Syrian people. 
All three member states link the state with responsibilities to stop the violent 
repression of the Syrian people and provide them with basic rights. The French 
perception becomes very apparent when the delegate states that the Syrian 
authorities “have lost all its legitimacy by murdering their own people” (UNSC 
2011b:3). When placing the responsibility for the crisis, the three member states 
again agree. They primarily place this responsibility with the regime. In this 
regard the American representative frames the Syrian government as: “(…) 
responsible for the main security threats.” (UNSC 2012c:10). Both China and 
Russia are inclined to the same perception, although not as unambiguous. Here 
exemplified in a Russian statement: “However, the continuation of this tragedy 
cannot be blamed only on the harsh actions of the authorities.” (UNSC 2011b:4). 
Additionally, China calls upon the regime to respect the Syrian people’s request 
for reforms. 
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Within the R2P norm a state’s responsibility stretches beyond protection. A 
state must also provide rights and freedom to its people, as part of the preventive 
aspect of R2P. Thus the state has the primary responsibility in regard to both 
protection from the four R2P related crimes and the prevention of the emergence 
of these.    
In this way we argue, that the perceptions by all members of the UNSC 
correlate with the R2P norm. However, they emphasises the responsibility of the 
Syrian regime in regard to the conflict to very different degrees. Thus the French, 
American and British perceptions are much more in line with R2P as they are 
unequivocal in placing the responsibility with the Syrian state, and further stress 
the importance of basic rights. The Chinese and Russian perceptions regarding to 
the responsibility of the conflict, is as stated not as unequivocally referring to the 
Syrian state. Rather the Russians and the Chinese are cautious in placing the 
initial responsibility with the state, but asks both parties to end the violence. 
 
Responsibilities of the Individual  
The perceptions of the UNSC members, relating to the responsibilities of 
individuals, are highly differentiated. The French perception is very 
unambiguously stated, when the opposition against the Syrian regime is framed as 
“legitimate aspirations” (UNSC 2011b:2). The French representative does, 
however, ask the opposition to put an end to the violence, thus recognising that it 
has a part in the fighting. Both the Chinese and the British delegate are more 
divided on the subject and urges “the various parties in Syria to exercise restraint 
and to avoid more bloodshed and all forms of violence” (UNSC 2011b:5). The 
Russian delegate perceives the oppositions resistance as illegitimate, thus 
suggesting that responsibility is also very much with the people. In this relation it 
is stated that the Syrian opposition “have been pushing their own geopolitical 
intentions, which have nothing in common with the legitimate interests of the 
Syrian people” (UNSC 2012d:8). The United States are in opposition hereto and 
altogether fails to address a responsibility outside of the Syrian regime. 
Thus we argue that the Chinese and British perceptions are closest related to 
the R2P norm, in that they hold all parties responsible for the crisis. The Russian 
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perception is very much defined by an emphasis on state sovereignty, where the 
state is seen as the only legitimate practitioner of violence. The French perception, 
we will also argue, does not correlate with the R2P norm. In leaving out any 
criticism of the opposition, but instead framing it as legitimate, the French 
government legitimates the use of violence committed too by the opposition, 
which is not in line with the R2P norm. Concerning the United States, the failure 
of mentioning the opposition in relation to responsibility, groups the American 
perception along with the French. However, it is essential to stress that this line of 
argument roots in the perception of the internal responsibility of the state. As the 
state, within the R2P, is assigned responsibility to prevent, which is largely 
framed as providing basic right, it can be discussed if the opposition in Syria can 
be justified on the basis of the Syrian regime failing this responsibility.  
 
Responsibility of the International Community to Respond and the Role of 
Regime Change 
The member state’s perceptions of the international community, in relation to the 
Syrian crisis, are very much influenced by their individual perceptions of the state 
sovereignty. Again there is a strong division of perceptions within the UNSC. The 
Western states, the UK, France and the USA, are all strong proponents of an 
international responsibility to protect the Syrian people from the regime, and thus 
an international respond. All three countries assert the use of sanctions in order to 
pressurise the Syrian regime. This perception, we argue, is in line with the 
perception inherent in the R2P norm, which prescribes that the international 
community has a responsibility to respond to crises where mass atrocities occur. 
In this regard sanctions are perceived as legitimate diplomatic tools.   
China and Russia, in reverse, are not as determined in their perceptions 
regarding the role of the international community. Both states perceive a role for 
the international community in relation to halting the Syrian crisis, however their 
inclination towards respecting state sovereignty compel them to prescribe a less 
dynamic role. In opposition to any kind of coercive measures, they argue to 
support the means of dialogue between the two parties. As this initiative is 
directed at the relation between the two conflicting parties it does not necessarily 
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include the international community, thus it is not widely elaborated within the 
R2P norm. Russia even goes as far as stating that any dialogue established 
between the contending parties should be “conducted by the Syrians themselves” 
(UNSC 2012b:3). Thus we argue that the Chinese and Russian perceptions 
regarding the international community’s responsibility in the case of the Syrian 
crisis, is more limited than prescribed within the R2P. This is evident, when the 
Chinese delegate states that: “(…) sovereign equality and non-interference in the 
internal affairs of other countries are the basic norms governing inter-State 
relations enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations” (UNSC 2012d:13). 
As stated above, we argue that there is a great division between the western 
and the eastern states in relation to their perceptions of the role of the international 
community in regards to the Syrian conflict. However, four of the five member 
states, namely France, the UK, China and the USA, all stress the need for an 
international response to prevent the possible destabilisation of the Middle Eastern 
region as a consequence of the Syrian crisis. We argue that this perception is in 
continuation of the UN Charter and thereby the R2P Norm, which prescribes 
international response to crisis that constitute regional security. 
In relation to the outcome of an international response France, the UK and 
the USA all perceive a response to the Syrian crisis as entailing a political 
transition. Both Russia and China recognises the need for reform, but does not 
mention transition. The French and American representatives are additionally both 
very unequivocal in demanding that the political transition leads to democracy. 
The delegate of the UK is less clear in stating his country’s expectations to the 
outcome of an international response. 
We argue that response leading a transition towards democracy is not 
representative of the R2P norm, thus both France and the USA deviate on this 
aspect. Then the perceptions by China, Russia and UK correlate more with R2P, 
as they are less demanding. 
In this relation we argue that the French and American perceptions relating 
to the outcome of an international response, can be understood as amounting to 
outright regime change. This argument is based on the interpretation that both the 
American and French governments no longer perceive the Al-Assad regime 
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neither as legitimate nor as a proponent of democracy. Thus the logical conclusion 
must be that his government is not likely to be included in a transition to 
democracy. However, the French, British and Americans have on separate 
occasions denied that they are in favour of a Syrian regime change. The refusals 
of this notion have been aimed at refuting allegations made by the Chinese and 
Russians, claiming that specific suggested draft resolutions were merely pretexts 
for military intervention and regime change. The Russians directly connects Syria 
with the Libyan case of military intervention and regime change when they state 
that: “The situation in Syria cannot be considered in the Council separately from 
the Libyan experience” (UNSC 2011b:4). 
Thus we argue that the issue of regime change plays a significant role in the 
Russian and Chinese perceptions of the Syrian crisis, in that both countries refer 
to the fear of regime change as grounds for not supporting specific resolutions 
relating to the Syrian conflict. 
 
Collaboration and the Security Council  
In relation to the Syrian crisis collaboration within the UNSC is related to the 
above-disseminated issue of response to the crisis. Again, the clear division of 
opinions is evident in that China and Russia both have applied their veto-right in 
preventing the enactment of draft-resolutions. Their reasons for applying veto 
revolve around opposition towards coercive measures and regime change. For 
instance, the Russian delegate refers to draft resolution S/2012/77 as “calling for 
regime change” (UNSC 2012a:9).  
The American, French and British delegates express an explicit criticism 
towards the use of veto, as disappointment and indication of the international 
community failing its responsibilities. Thus we argue that the issue of regime 
change plays a significant role regarding the application of veto, and thus 
preventing collective R2P actions within the UNSC. 
We argue that the British, French and American perceptions represent the 
R2P norm. This is evident as the R2P norm prescribes that in situations of mass 
atrocities, the international community must enact their responsibility, by issuing 
collective action through a united UNSC. However, the French and American 
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representative states that their governments will seek to invoke actions towards 
the Syrian regime, through forums outside of the UNSC. Both delegates claim the 
applications of vetoes as their reasons for this. This is not consistent with the R2P 
norm, which clearly perceives that all actions, relating to crises of mass atrocities, 
should be commenced through collective action issued by the UNSC. 
 
Chapter 8 Conclusive Remarks 
This research paper has shown a clear division within the United Nations Security 
Council relating to the individual members state’s perceptions of the Syrian 
Conflict. This division in perceptions is generally related to whether the 
perceptions are shaped by the perception of intra-state conflict inherent in the R2P 
norm, or not. Thus the division is between those states that perceive the Syrian 
conflict as a case where the international community has a responsibility to 
protect the Syrian people and those that emphasise state sovereignty in articulated 
opposition to this perception. Consequently the R2P norm seems to influence both 
perceptions. We therefore argue that the R2P norm plays a definite role in the 
UNSC member state’s perceptions of the Syrian conflict. Thus we can conclude 
that the responsibility to protect is present to a great extent in the perceptions, of 
the five permanent member states of the Security Council, relating to the Syrian 
conflict. However, we stress that not all the member states’ perceptions are 
equally expressing the R2P norm. 
 Additionally the issue of regime change plays a distinct role in shaping the 
perceptions of the UNSC member states, in relation to the Syrian conflict. Like 
the R2P norm, the issue of regime change influences the perceptions of the UNSC 
member states to a great extent. While the issue of regime change shapes some 
UNSC members’ perceptions because they are opposed to regime change in Syria, 
others member states perceptions’ are shaped by this issue, because they, 
arguably, aim at invoking regime change in Syria. It is therefore clear that the R2P 
norm and the issue of regime change are interlinked in the case of the Syrian 
crisis. However, we stress that the issue of regime change does not influence all 
the member states’ perceptions equally. In conclusion, the issue of regime change 
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greatly influences the UNSC members’ perceptions of the Syrian crisis in relation 
to the responsibility to protect. It is evident that those states, which advocate 
regime change, have perceptions, regarding the Syrian conflict, which greatly 
correlate with the R2P norm. Reversely we will argue that those states, which 
oppose regime change, are very rarely holding perceptions of the Syrian crisis that 
correlate with the R2P norm. Thus we argue that the division within the UNSC, in 
regards to the Syrian conflict, is related to both the issue of regime change and the 
R2P norm.  
 
One of the questions that arise in the wake of this research, is weather the issue of 
regime change, emerging from the Libyan intervention and decisive in UNSC 
response to the Syrian conflict, has forever taken permanent residence within the 
dilemma of intervening in intra-state conflicts. We believe that our findings 
suggest that the issue of regime change is so decisive in the Syrian conflict that 
there are reasons to conduct further research upon the role of regime change in 
other R2P-related situations. This would elaborate the role that regime change 
plays, suggesting whether it is a permanent issue or a contingent factor, which 
was only relevant in a short moment after Syria. Furthermore it will be interesting 
to conduct continuous research on the relationship between the R2P norm and the 
issue of regime change.   
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